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REASONS AND RATIONALITY 
Sven Nyholm 
 
The questions that I will be discussing are: 
 
Q1: What is the relation (and difference) between normative reasons and 
motivating (and/or explanatory) reasons? 
and 
Q2: When are, or in virtue of what are, acts, desires or beliefs rational (or 
irrational)? 
 
Because the two subjects that I will discussreasons and rationalityare so closely 
related, I dont think that one can discuss one without mentioning the other. I shall, 
however, have more to say about Q1. Questions about reasons are, I believe, more 
fundamental than questions about rationality.       
      Following Bernard Williams1, I distinguish between internalism and externalism about 
normative reasons. Internalism is the view that there is a necessary connection between our 
normative reasons and our motivations. Unlike Williams I believe that we should take the 
externalist view, which is the view that there is no such necessary connection.  
      One of Williams claims is that claims about external reasons make little or no sense. I 
argue that, though they cannot, by means of reduction, be properly or thoroughly 
explained, such claims do make sense if we take them to be irreducibly normative. Thus 
we dont need to explain what it is to believe that one has some reason; what one believes 
is simply that one has this reason.   
      Reasons are, on the view that I will be defending, facts that count in favour of caring 
about certain things or living in certain ways. A fact is a reason if it has normative 
significance and if it, thus, matters. However, to say that something matters is basically to 
say that there is reason to care about it. Thus claims about reasons cannot, just like I said 
above, be reduced to claims about other things that arent normative. Claims or beliefs 
about normative reasons are, if they are to be truly normative, irreducibly normative. 
Williams internalism, I will argue, fails because it cannot account for the normative 
content of normative claims or beliefs. Normative claims cannot be properly explained in 
non-normative terms. The term reason is ambiguous and can therefore mislead the 
theorist who is trying to make sense of the different senses of the term. My main critique 
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against internalism will be that it conflates normative reasons with motivating reasons. 
Though I believe that normative reasons are explanatory in one sense, I shall argue that 
they are not explanatory in the sense that Williams, as we shall see, takes them to be.  
      What, then, is the relation between our reasons and our motivations? My answer is that 
there is a normative relation between them. It is true of us that we should want or do 
certain things, or else we are being irrational. We are, because we can reason, open to 
rational criticism. To be rational is, I will argue, to be able to recognize and respond to 
reasons. To have this ability is to be generally rational, and if one is generally rational, it is 
meaningful to ask, in given situations, whether one is being rational or not. As only 
persons, as far as we know, have the rational ability to reason, it is only they that can be 
rational or irrational.       
      While the rationality of our actions depends on our beliefs, what reasons we have does 
not. Thus if I have false beliefs, I may be rational in doing what there really is no reason 
for me to do. The belief in question may be irrational though. I shall discuss four different 
ways in which beliefs can be rational or irrational. The rationality of our beliefs is not 
solely dependent on their relations to reasons. Beliefs can also be irrational because they 
arent consistent with other beliefs that we have. Thus, it can, for the sake of consistency, 
be rational to believe what there is no reason to believe.       
       Both beliefs and desires can, I believe, be intrinsically rational or irrational. It is 
usually easier to tell when beliefs or desires are intrinsically irrational. They are irrational 
in this sense when the content of the belief, or the object of desire, is such that it is obvious 
that we dont have reason to believe, or desire, what is believed, or desired. These claims 
are claims that can only be made on the kind of view that I am defending.  
      If it is intrinsically rational to desire something, then the object of desire is of value. 
Thus we can say that claiming that something is good is basically another way of saying 
that there is reason to care about it for its own sake; something is good if it has features 
that give us reasons to care about it. 
      I shall start out by discussing reasons. Having done that I will, in the light of the 
conclusions I draw about reasons, turn my attention to rationality. I call the view that I will 
be defending here Normative Realism. Externalists about reasons dont have to take this 
view. There are, for instance, also constructivist2 views about external reasons that are 
promising, but I shall not discuss such views or why I think that we should reject them 
here. Nor shall I defend normative realism against some of the objections that may be 
raised against such a view.3 My way of arguing for normative realism will thus be indirect 
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in the sense that I present it as, what I take to be, a better alternative to the internalist view 
defended by Williams that I below will present and reject. 
 
Different kinds of reasons4 
 
Since the word reason is so ambiguous, I first have to say a little about certain 
distinctions and the different senses of reason that will be important in the discussion. 
While doing this I shall try to point out where the problems and the disagreements are 
found. We can begin by considering the following situation:   
 
The fire: Unaware of the fact that my hotel is on fire, I am about to go to sleep. 
If I hadnt been using earplugs in order to shut noise out, I would most likely 
have heard the people panicking in the hallway. Thus instead of saving myself 
by jumping into the canal outside my window, I decide to try to sleep, as I am 
feeling quite tired.5 
 
I would like to make the following three remarks about this situation: First and foremost, it 
appears clear that I here, even though I am unaware of it, have a good reason to jump out 
of the window. Second, my failure to do what I have reason to do is, since I am not aware 
of the fact that the building is on fire, not a case of irrationality. And finally, the 
explanatory reason for my going to bed seems to be that I am tired. The first claim is a 
claim about what normative reasons I have, the second claim concerns the rationality of 
my acting and the third claim aims to explain why I act the way I do in this given situation. 
It is the interpretation of the first claim that I, in this paper, will say most about.  
      When we speak of normative reasons for acting, desiring or believing we attempt to 
justify our acts, desires and beliefs. As reflecting beings most of us want to be able to 
justify how we live, not only to others, but to ourselves as well. Thus we also think about 
reasons in order to find motivation. If I dont believe that there is any reason to do x, or if I 
believe that there are reasons against doing x, then it is unlikely, if I am rational, that I will 
be motivated to do x. Alternatively if I believe that that there are reasons to do x, it is likely 
that I will be motivated to do x, as this belief will make x appear meaningful.6  
      When we make claims about reasons we can, roughly, be said to be trying to answer 
questions starting with why. Think of questions like why should I jump?, why do you 
believe that the building is on fire? and why do you want to jump?. The answers to 
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these questions are all reasons. Thus reasons, besides justifying, also explain. They explain 
either why we ought to, or why we do, act, desire or believe various things. This 
distinction between why, on the one hand, we ought to act, desire and believe, and why we, 
on the other hand, do act, desire and believe, is a distinction that, throughout the course of 
this paper, will be of great importance. 
      Now, how does what I have just said apply to the example given above? Suppose that 
the phone rings and that you are on the other end. You tell me that I should jump out of the 
window and, baffled by this, I reply why?. You say that I should jump because the 
building is on fire. I reply by asking why you believe that the building is on fire and you 
answer by saying something like because I see flames and smell smokeyou are in the 
building across the street we can supposeand thereby offer two reasons to believe that 
the building is on fire. Because I take these to be good reasons to believe that this is true 
and because I take the fact that the building is on fire to be a good reason to jump out the 
window, I now want to jump. Failing to want to jump upon receiving this information 
seems, as the fact that the building is on fire appears to be a strong reason for me to jump, 
to be irrational; jumping would save my life.  
      Now, the fact that the building Im in is on fire seems, then, to be good a reason for me 
to jump. If I stay in my room I will either be badly burned or die. If I am aware of the fact 
that jumping would save my life then I will, hopefully, be motivated to jump out the 
window. If that is the case, then my motivating reason is the content of my belief that 
jumping will save me, while the normative reason is the fact that jumping will save me.  
      Sometimes we do things that we have no good reasons to do. Thus the idea of 
motivating reasons is distinct from that of normative reasons. This would, as should be 
kept in mind, be true even if we always did what we have good reasons to do. And, if there 
were no such things as normative reasons, we could still explain peoples acting. 
       When we speak of explanatory reasons our aim is, as the name implies, to explain 
actions. Our explanatory reasons are our motivating reasons when we act intentionally. 
When we act intentionally we can answer questions about why we act as we do. Though 
we often take our motivating reasons to be good reasons, we do sometimes admit that our 
reasons for acting arent good ones; as rational beings we know that we sometimes act 
irrationally.  
     Keep in mind also that we sometimes do things unintentionally. At such times our 
actions should not be explained by appealing to motivating reasons. We ought then only to 
speak of explanatory reasons. Why, for example, did Tim walk about the house like a 
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zombie last night, not answering when spoken to? The answer, or explanation, is that he 
was walking in his sleep. Here it seems awkward to speak of any motivating reasons. 
Acting on reflexes also excludes motivating reasons and, as it is possible to explain such 
acting, we can conclude that motivating reasons and explanatory reasons arent necessarily 
the same thing7.  
      We are, as persons, able to recognise normative reasons and to respond to them. Our 
motivating reasons are then the same as our normative reasons in the sense that they both 
depend on the same fact(s)8. When we act rationally and have no false beliefsthe 
rationality of our actions depends, as I will get back to, on our beliefsour normative 
reasons will be our motivating and, thus, also our explanatory reasons9. So, even if the 
different kinds of reasons that we are discussing coincide in a way at times when we are 
rational, we here have three separable kinds of reasons: Normative reasons are facts we 
ought to be motivated by. Motivating reasons explain our actions when we act 
intentionally and are thus explanatory reasons. When we act unintentionally, for example 
when we act on reflexes, there are still explanatory reasonslike the fact that we have 
certain reflexesthat explain why we acted as we did.  
      Explanatory reasons can be relevant to appeal to in causal explanation. A persons 
being in some mental state may cause her to act in a given way. If we accept this, we hold, 
what Jonathan Dancy10 calls, a psychologistic view. When we explain actions by appealing 
to explanatory reasons, we take the third-person perspective. When it comes to motivating 
reasons, it is the content of these mental statesor, more exactly, our beliefsthat is 
relevant. The first-person perspective is, in explanations in which motivating reasons are 
appealed to, what is taken. When we are discussing the rationality of peoples acting, 
desiring and believing it is motivating reasons that are most relevant. There is, as should be 
recognised, no conflict involved here. Consider an example: Because John believes that he 
will be able to catch his train if he runs to the station, he runs. The explanatory reason for 
him running was that he was in a particular mental state. His motivating reason was the 
content of his belief, i.e. that running to the station would make it more likely that he 
would be on time. Thus, if we ask him why he is running, he will answer that he has to in 
order to make it to the train on time. He will not answer that he runs because he was in a 
particular mental state before he started running. This will be important later on.  
      That we can distinguish between normative and motivating reasons is widely accepted. 
It is the nature of the relation between these kinds of reasons that creates controversy.  
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Good reasons and strong reasons 
 
The following is what I, when I say that there is reason to do or want something, will be 
meaning: To say that something is a normative reason speaking in favour of doing or 
wanting something, is to say that doing or wanting this thing for this reason would be to do 
or want it for a good reason. Thus whenever we say that there is reason to do or want 
something, we dont need to say that there is a good reason11 to do or want this thing; that 
is implied when we say that there is reason to do or want it. If we say that something is a 
good reason, we dont add anything.12  
      When we say that someones reason for doing or wanting something is a bad reason, 
we are basically saying that there is no reason for doing or wanting this thing. The person 
may, if she has got false beliefs about the thing in question, not, we could grant, be 
irrational in doing or wanting this thing. So, to say that there is no reason for someone to 
do, or want, something is not necessarily the same as saying that anyone who does, or 
wants, this thing is being irrational. Thus when Louie the fourteenth had all of his teeth 
removed because he (for some obscure reason) thought that it would be good for him, he 
wasnt, even though there was reason to abstain from doing this, necessarily being 
irrational. He may have had some false belief about teeth whose truth could have given 
him reason to want to do this. Besides, there may actually have been some reason speaking 
in favour of pulling out all of your teeth in those days. Maybe it showed that you were rich 
enough not to have to chew. But if this actually was a reason for getting rid of ones teeth, 
it could not have overridden the reasons against doing this. When there are both reasons 
speaking against and in favour of doing, or wanting something, we can ask what reasons 
are the strongest. Something can be a reason without being a strong reason; if something is 
a reason to do or want something, it is still, even if it is a weak one, what we, on my 
understanding of these concepts, can call a good reason to do, or want, this thing.  
  
The internalism/externalism-distinction  
 
I have, up until now, tried to leave it open how we, more exactly, ought to understand 
claims about normative reasons and the nature of such reasons. We shall now, in order to 
get our discussion about this really started, consider Williams very influential view on the 
relation between normative reasons and motivation. Williams makes a distinction between 
internalism and externalism about normative reasons. On internalism, which is the view 
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that he favours, there is a necessary connection between an agents reasons and her 
motivations. Contrary to Williams I believe that we should accept externalism, which, 
simply put, is the denial of this supposedly necessary connection. When Williams first 
introduced the distinction in question, he made the following presentation: 
 
Sentences of the forms A has a reason to [do x] or there is a reason for A to 
[do x] () seem on the face of it to have two different sorts of interpretation. 
On the first, the truth of the sentence implies, very roughly, that A has some 
motive which will be served or furthered by him [doing x] (). On the second 
interpretation, there is no such condition, and the reason-sentence will not be 
falsified by the absence of an appropriate motive.13  
 
We shall, following Williams, call followers the first interpretation internalists and 
followers of the second interpretation externalists. We can also, at first glance, note that 
this passage seems to imply that what we are discussing here are solely questions about 
meaning. Thus, in a later article on the same subject matter Williams asks: what are we 
saying when we say someone has a reason to do something?14 and later, in the same 
article, he says that he thinks that the sense of a statement of the form A has reason to [do 
x] is given by the internalist model15. But, when we ask, as Williams also does, what the 
truth conditions for reason statements are, and when we ask what claims about reasons are 
about, these questions cannot, I believe, merely be questions about language. We also want 
to know what a reason is, and in what sense reasons, if they exist in any sense, exists. Are 
there, in other words, any reasons?  
 
Normative Realism 
 
Beliefs about reasons, we should be aware, could be illusions; there may not be any such 
thing as normative reasons. This, I believe, is a genuine possibility. On the internalist view, 
it may be objected, this possibility is excluded. What this view claims is rather that some 
of our beliefs or claims about reasons are false or make little or no sense. A true reason 
statement or belief is not a statement or belief about some external fact or truth; a true 
statement or belief to the effect that somebody has a reason implies, rather, that a certain 
action is one that an agent could, or would, be motivated to perform under certain 
conditions. Thus it might be held that we, on internalism, dont have beliefs about 
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reasons, but beliefs about the relation between certain actions and their relations to our 
motives/motivation. And, when no such relation holds, it is correct to say that the agent 
does not have reason to perform this action.  
       We should, I believe, reject such claims; claims and/or beliefs about reasons are, or so 
I shall argue, not claims about relations between actions and motivations in the sense just 
described. On the externalist view that I believe we should accept it is true that beliefs can 
be irreducibly normativewe assign the status of reason-hood to certain factsand that 
there are irreducibly normative truths16some of these beliefs are true. Accepting 
internalism would, on this view, be to believe that there are no normative reasons. As I 
believe that there are normative reasons in the non-reductionist sense just mentioned, I call 
the view that I am defending Normative Realism17.  
      Since the internalist view may seem less controversial, I must, in order to make a case 
for normative realism, try to show why we should not accept internalism. Let us, therefore, 
get to that.  
 
The first formulation of the internalist view 
 
Formulated as in the Williams quote above, the internalist view may appear unclear. The 
inclusion of the term motive is what I, especially, have in mind. Motives, taken at face 
value, appear to be what I have called motivating reasons. Motivating reasons, I have said, 
are contents of our beliefs that motivate us. If motives were the same as motivating reasons 
they would, then, be beliefs. Williams, however, takes motives to be members of, what he 
calls, an agents motivational set (or the agents S), which may include the agents desires, 
evaluations, attitudes, projects and so on18. With the possible expectation of evaluations, 
few of these so-called motives appear to be beliefs. What we have here are rather desires, 
pro-attitudes and/or intentions. So motives are, then, not the same thing as that which I 
have called motivating reasons. One cannot serve or further ones motivating reasons, 
they are simply things that motivate us. For this reason, I shall take motives to be 
motivations or desires.  
      To explain the internalist view Williams assembles four propositions that he takes to be 
true of internalism19. What I have said above about internalism implies the first one, which 
reads: 
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(i) An internal reason statement is falsified by the absence of some appropriate 
element from S  
 
Given the formulation above it appears to be the case that we, according to the internalist, 
have reason to serve or further all or any of our motives/motivations. That this is deeply 
implausible is recognised by Williams. He considers an example in which an agent desires 
a gin and tonic20. The agent thinks that the stuff in front of him is gin and wants, therefore, 
to mix it with tonic and drink it. However, the stuff is in fact petrol. As Williams notes, it 
appears clear that the agent does not have reason to act on this desire. The reason Williams 
offers for this is the following: had the agent known that it was petrol and not gin that he 
has in front of him, it is most likely that he no longer would desire to mix it with tonic and 
drink it. From this Williams extracts: 
 
(ii) A member of S, D, will not give A a reason to [do x] if either the existence 
of D is dependent on false belief, or As belief in the relevance of [doing x] to 
the satisfaction of D is false.  
 
From this Williams deduces the following epistemic consequence: 
 
(iii) (a)  A may falsely believe an internal reason statement about himself, and 
(we can add) (b)  A may not know some true internal reason statement about 
himself. 
 
(b) is partly explained by Williams fourth proposition which reads: 
 
(iv) internal reason statements can be discovered in deliberative reasoning 
 
Williams wording here, and in (iii) as well, seems to suggest that the view he has in mind 
is analytically reductive. Upon having deliberated the agent, Williams claims, may be 
correct in saying about herself that she has a reason to do a certain thing. By this the agent 
will, it seems, mean nothing more than that doing this thing will serve or further a motive 
that she has in her S. This would, rather than being a normative claim, be a non-normative 
claim about the relation between a particular action and the agents S; it would, I believe, 
be a claim about a motivating and not a normative reason. If this is all that the correct 
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application of the word reason amounts to, there would, I believe, be no truly normative 
reasons; there would only be relations between acts and motivations that could properly be 
described by using the word in question. 
      Perhaps Williams should have written: 
 
 (iv*) internal reasons can be discovered in deliberative reasoning 
 
This could mean that an agent could, after having deliberated, come to conclude that he has 
a reason to perform a certain action. Assuming that he accepts internalism, his reasoning 
could go like this: 
 
(1) I am now, after having deliberated, motivated in a certain way (and, so far as I 
know, this motive does not rest on any false beliefs) 
(2) Doing x would serve or further my motive 
(3) We have reasons to do things if they would serve or further our motives, given that 
our motives dont rest on false beliefs 
Therefore (so far as I know): 
(4)I have reason to do x21 
 
This agent doesnt merely want to know whether it is correct to say about her that she has a 
reason to act. She doesnt, in other words, want to know whether it could, as another way 
of describing the relation between some act and some motive of hers, be correct to say that 
she has a reason. What she wants to know is not how she should use certain words, but 
rather how she should act; she wants to know whether, or not, she has a reason to act. That 
she has a motivating reason, or is motivated in a certain way, is something that she already 
knows. The question is whether she has a normative reason to act as she is motivated to 
act. The claim that she would, after deliberation, be motivated to do x, is not a normative 
claim. Nor is the claim that somebody believes of herself that she has a normative reason 
normative.  
      In virtue of what, we may now ask, is it true that the agent in question has a normative 
reason to act? We can, in order to try to answer this question, consider two different kinds 
of internalisms. 
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Internalisms 
 
Williams did, as we have seen, make the claim that the truth of the sentence [that A has a 
reason to do x] implies, very roughly, that A has some motive which will be served or 
furthered by him [doing x].22 This seems to allow us to, within internalism, make a further 
distinction, namely between:  
 
The desire fulfilment view: A has a reason to do x if doing x would help fulfil 
desires that A wouldnt lose after going through deliberation    
and 
The deliberative view: A has a reason to do x if, after going through 
deliberation, x is what A would be most motivated to do 
 
The first view I get from served and the second I get from furthered. In order to 
evaluate these views, we can consider less sophisticated versions of them: 
 
The simple desire fulfilment view: A has a reason to do x if doing x would help 
fulfil As present desires 
 
The simple deliberative view: A has a reason to do x if x is what A is presently 
most motivated to do 
 
Even though it may appear clear that both these views are implausible, there is one feature 
that the first of these two views has that makes it a little more plausible than the other: That 
doing a certain thing would help fulfil a desire of yours could, we should agree, be a reason 
for you to do this thing. Acting just because you want to appears to be to act for no reason. 
Sometimes when we are asked why we are doing some particular thing, we simply answer: 
No reasonI just felt like it. On the deliberation view, be it the simple or the 
sophisticated version, that is a reason. We may ask a person who gives an answer of the 
kind just mentioned why she felt like doing whatever it is she is doing. Here we may 
expect a more informative answer; we dont just come to desire things. Besides, if we did, 
that doesnt seem to be something that could be the source of reasons. 
      Remember now my distinction between explanatory and motivating reasons. There are, 
even if there arent always motivating reasons, always explanatory reasons why we have 
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the desires we have. I desire to eat because I havent eaten for a couple of hours. I am tired 
because I have been up too long. And so on. Sometimes we desire things as a result of our 
beliefs. I desire to go on a trip to New York City because I believe that I would enjoy it. In 
such cases we know why we desire what we desire. However, it may also be the case that 
we dont really know why we desire some of the things we desire. In such cases it seems 
unlikely that these desires could provide reasons for us to act.  
      Reasons, I have claimed, do two jobs: They justify our acting, desiring and believing, 
and they explain why our acts, desires and beliefs can be, or are, justified. Can internal 
reasons justify and explain why we ought to care about certain things or do certain things? 
Consider first the question of justification applied to the deliberative view. After going 
through sound deliberation, what I most want to do is x. Does this justify my doing x? It 
may be the case that I am justified in doing x, but does my wanting to do x under certain 
conditions constitute this justification? Somehow it seems reasonable to ask why I am 
motivated to do x. What considerations made me want to do x? This, I believe, has to be 
what is relevant. If I, for instance, want to do x because this would prevent me from great 
suffering, it appears clear that I can justify my wanting to do x. That doing x would prevent 
me from suffering can also explain why this motivation of mine is justified. This, to me, 
strongly suggests that the deliberative view is mistaken. Whats important, or relevant, is 
why I am motivated in certain ways.   
      Consider now the desire fulfilment view. That I have a reason to do x is, on this view, 
true if doing x would help fulfil the desires I would have after having deliberated soundly. 
This has more explanatory value. That doing x would help fulfil a desire of mine explains 
some of the point of doing x. But, if it is to justify my doing x, it is still important to know 
whether the desire that doing x would help fulfil is one that I can justify and here we can 
again appeal to the points I just made about the deliberative view. We might also ask why, 
or whether, it is a good thing that some desire is fulfilled. Insofar as fulfilling a certain 
desire would bring me some kind of satisfaction it certainly appears true that I could have 
reason to fulfil this desire. But the reason for me to do x then appears to be that doing x 
will bring me pleasure, rather than that doing x would fulfil my desire. And, it cannot, 
moreover, be true that it is always good to fulfil our desires. Some of us desire to hurt other 
people. These people may not lose these desires after finding out what is relevant to know 
about other peoples pain. On the desire fulfilment view these people would have reason to 
start hurting other people. That cannot be true. Surely they will have motivating reasons, 
but such reasons should not, as I have argued, be conflated with normative reasons. 
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      Williams does, as Ive already said above, reject the simple views. This implies that he 
takes the element of deliberation to be of great normative importance. It may, therefore, be 
there that we find the element of normativity that we have been looking for. 
 
A better formulation of the internalist view 
 
In a postscript to Internal and External Reasons Williams writes: 
 
The formulation of the internalist position that I now favour is: A has a reason 
to [do x] only if there is a sound deliberative route from As subjective 
motivational set () to As [doing x].23 
 
I agree with Williams that this is a better formulation. In the first formulation considered 
above normative and motivating reasons are conflated in a way which appears to do away 
with normativity. Williams may have been moved by this kind of consideration when he 
got convinced that there was a better way of expressing the internalist thesis. He writes: 
 
It is important that even on the internalist view a statement of the form A has 
a reason to [do x] has normative force. ()A has a reason to [do x] means 
more than A is presently disposed to [do x]. One reason why it must do so is 
that it plays an important part in discussions about what people should become 
disposed to do.24 
 
This may be taken as being trivial; that we cannot have normative discussions without 
normative concepts is undeniably true. Williams may have had something more important 
in mind. Consider: 
 
The appeal to the need for normative concepts: It may be true that we actually, 
in a non-trivial sense, have reasons to want, and do, certain things. If we dont 
have any concepts that are truly normative, we cannot discuss questions about 
these things. Neither does it seem that we could have any normative beliefs. 
Therefore, we need concepts that are truly normative.  
 
 14
This appeal to the need for normative concepts is not trivial. The question now is whether 
the internalist view really is normative in the relevant sense. 
      Consider these two claims that could be made by internalists: 
 
C1: A has a reason to do x if A could, after going through sound deliberation, 
be motivated to do x 
 
C2: A has a reason to do x if A would, after going through sound deliberation, 
be motivated to do x 
 
While C1 speaks of a possibility to reach the conclusion to act, C2 speaks of a necessity. 
We can start by considering C1. 
       C1, it seems, leaves it, as could allows for an extremely wide range of possibilities, 
rather open what the agent has reasons to do. Thus this view appears, we might say, to be 
unacceptably relativistic. This does, of course, depend on what counts as sound 
deliberation. As we shall see, this, i.e. that the view is rather relativistic, will be true if we 
accept Williams view of what sound deliberation is. It also, as we can note, seems to be 
the case that all it takes for it to be true that an agent no longer has reason to act in a given 
way is a change of heart. As this is true of C1, this formulation of internalism may seem 
hopelessly vague and open.  
      When it comes to C2 it will not, it seems, be left as open what the agent has reason to 
do. This, again, has to do with what counts as sound deliberation. It also has to do with 
what psychological assumptions one wishes to make. If we, for example, accept 
psychological hedonism, i.e. the belief that we ultimately always only seek pleasure, then it 
is only our beliefs about what best achieves this aim that will put constraints on, or will set 
limits to, the range of possible reasons we may have as a result of sound deliberation. 
However, taking into account the so-called paradox of hedonism, which is the very 
probable truth that we will be less successful in achieving our hedonistic aim if we only 
seek happiness (and nothing else) for its own sake, adherents of this view may claim that 
we have reason to seek other things for their own sake. Thus it will, given that different 
things bring different people pleasure, be true, just as internalists claim, that our reasons 
are relative to our subjective motivational sets. This may, however, to some extent also be 
true on externalist theories. It may, for example, be true that I have reason to do or want 
something that you have no reason to do or want, because, given our preferences, I will get 
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pleasure from doing this particular thing while you will not. The difference is that on 
externalism we have these reasons because of these latter facts about our possible pleasure 
or pains. And, these reasons are grounded in the desirability of pleasure and/or the 
(normative) fact that pain is something that is worth avoiding.  
      If the internalist accepts C2, then, we might ask, why should he reject externalism? 
Sound deliberation appears, on the face of it, to involve at least prudential considerations 
and, as moral rationalists claim, moral considerations as well. What we need to know, then, 
is what Williams means when he says that the deliberation ought to be sound. On the 
reading just suggested the distinction between internalism and externalism appears to come 
undone. The externalist could, as Parfit points out25, claim that it is true that, if we have 
reason to do x, substantively rational agents would be motivated to do x after deliberating 
soundly. To be substantively rational, it isnt enough to able to deliberate rationally, one 
must be motivated in certain rationally required ways, and, if presented with the 
opportunity, actually act on these desires.  
      There are, then, two questions that we first need to know the answers to, namely: 
 
Q3: Should the internalist accept C1 or C2? 
Q4: How should the internalist understand the idea of a sound deliberative 
route?  
 
Williams comments on this in the following way: 
 
[W]e cannot necessarily equate A could arrive by sound deliberative route at 
the decision to x, with A would arrive at that conclusion if he deliberated and 
did so soundly. Someone may, indeed, do what he has most reason to do 
without deliberating and, perhaps, because he did not deliberate. We must not 
assume that thinking about the question about what to do, rehearsing 
considerations, and so forth, are simply like the perception of an external 
reality.26 
 
Thus it appears that the internalist has to embrace C1 rather than C2. But that is, I believe, 
problematic. It is a problematically contingent question whether an agent would reach a 
certain conclusion after going through sound deliberation. This, of course, has to do with 
what one takes sound to imply. The risk here, for the internalist, is that we accept a too 
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broad interpretation, one which includes substantive constraints like the recognition of 
certain values or prudential or moral considerations. That, as I have said, would seem to 
undo the distinction between internalism and externalism. Externalists takes substantively 
rational agents to be agents that recognise certain aims as being worth achieving, or, 
alternatively worth avoiding and/or preventing. Even though he may not count as 
externalist we can note that Kant did, when he considered what it is to be a rational agent, 
claim that such an agent necessarily is committed to seeing himself acting impartially. On 
Williams view, this is far from clear. He remarks: 
 
[The internalist account] demands that the conclusion should be argued, and it 
cannot be acquired on the cheap, for instance by pointing out the obvious truth 
that people often describe unfair conduct as unreasonable. It takes more than 
ordinary language to deliver large Platonic, Aristotelian, or Kantian 
conclusions to the effect that that virtue and reason will coincide.27     
 
But, as must also be noted, Williams does grant that a desire to correct factual errors in 
ones reasoning is a necessary condition for being a sound deliberator. Concerning this, he 
makes following remarks: 
 
It may be asked why the agents deliberative route can, on the internalist 
account, be shown to be unsound by reference to factual mistakes, while 
claims that what the agent is doing is immoral or imprudent do not necessarily 
count as showing that the deliberative route is unsound. The answer to this is, 
crudely, that an agent is committed in general to acting in the light of sound 
information, simply by being a rational agent; included in the S of every 
rational agent is a desire not to fail through error.28 
 
Thus, one cannot, Williams claims, be considered a rational agent if one doesnt desire not 
to fail through error. Supposing that this may be true, why shouldnt we allow the 
recognition of certain values, moral and/or non-moral, to be necessary in order to count as 
a rational agent? In making this objection it can be left open exactly what these values are 
here; we dont have to say anything substantive about the desires of rational agents. We 
need only claim that rational agents are agents who care about certain things that are worth 
caring about. Does it not seem possible that certain normative beliefs arrived at after going 
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through a sound deliberative route, interpreted as being one without errors of facts, could 
be irrational simply in virtue of their content? If that is so, then these beliefs could be 
considered as being intrinsically irrational29. Consider this example: I consider how pain 
feels and reach the normative conclusion that I ought to seek it. If I know how pain feels, 
my deliberative route is in Williams sense sound, but it doesnt appear very sound to 
reach this normative conclusion, does it? Somehow it seems hard to think that it is true that 
I have reason to seek pain. Some may be tempted to say that no believable agent would 
arrive at this conclusion, but we should not, I believe, assume this. We should, rather, 
admit that it may be possible that the agent could arrive at this strange conclusion, and note 
that it appears strongly counter intuitive to call the reasoning of this agent sound. 
      The point, then, is this: if we accept C1, we must accept that the most absurd 
conclusions about what reasons people have may be true. Normative beliefs cannot be 
intrinsically irrational, or irrational in virtue of their content. Somehow this seems hard to 
believe. If we can allow Williams deliberative constraints on rational agents, then, I ask, 
what is the further reason for not including other constraints?  
 
Williams examples 
 
In the course of his discussions of these matters, Williams makes use of a couple of 
examples that we, in the light of what have said above, now will consider. I have already 
mentioned the example with the man who wants gin and tonic. In that example internalism, 
we noted, seemed to get things right. It was obvious that the man in the example did not 
have reason to mix the stuff in front of him with tonic and drink it. The internalist 
explanation of this agent not having this reason was that he would have lost his desire to 
mix this drink if he were to find out that it was petrol and not gin that he had in front of 
him. I, on the other hand, have claimed that what is relevant to know is, rather whether we 
under certain circumstances would have certain desires, why we have the desires that we 
have, or that we under other circumstances would have. Do our motivating reasons for 
having these desires justify our having them? If they do, I claimed, they do so because they 
explain why we are right, or rational, in being motivated accordingly.  
       Now, Williams discusses other examples, in which internalism does not appear to get 
things right. In one example we imagine a man who needs to take a certain medicine. He 
knows this, but doesnt care. Persuasively he denies that he has any interest in preserving 
his health. On internalism it is therefore true that this man has no reason to take his 
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medicine.30 This, to me, appears strongly counter-intuitive. That he needs the medicine 
appears to be a reason in itself for taking it; if we ask why this man should take the 
medicine and it is answered that he should take it because he needs it to preserve his 
health, then this appears to be a satisfactory answer. It may be the case that he wishes not 
to take it because he knows that, as he has a terminal disease which causes him to be in 
constant pain, all that the medicine will do is to prolong his suffering. If this is the case, it 
might be true that he has reason not to take the medicine. But this reason, again, would not 
be provided by the fact that he has this motivation, but by the fact that the few days that he 
could go on living would only involve constant pain. These further details are, however, 
ones that I have added only in order to show that it need not always, on externalism, be the 
case that we have reason to take medication. In Williams example no such details are 
added and it may be the case that this man could, if he takes his medicine, go on to live a 
long and rewarding life. If that is the case, then it appears strange to say that he, just 
because he doesnt care, doesnt have any reason to take the medicine.   
      We can here also return to the example we began by considering, in which I claimed 
that I, as my hotel was on fire, had a reason to jump out of the window. With regards to 
this example it may be objected that it is unsatisfactory because it is under-described. 
What, it might be asked, if I want to die? This objection, I believe, begs the question in 
favour of internalism, as it seems to presuppose that what I want determines what reasons I 
have. The point of the example was to illustrate a situation in which it appeared clear that I, 
even though I was unaware of it, had a reason to do something. If the fact that the building 
was on fire came to my attention, it is most likely that I would be motivated to jump. But 
that would be because I strongly would believe that I did have a reason to do so. If it was 
the case that I wanted to die, we could again ask whether this desire was rational. It may 
even be the case that, even though my supposed desire to die might be rational, I have 
reason to jump. Being burned alive does not appear to be a very pleasant, or dignified, way 
of dying. Just as the man in the last example could be rational in wanting to stop living 
because he suffered tremendously from disease, this may be what motivates my desire to 
die. And, I may want to die in a more peaceful way by means of euthanasia aided by 
doctors who see to it that I die in a painless and planned way. Such a desire could, I 
believe, be rational. 
      In another example, which I take to be the most counter-intuitive one, Williams 
imagines a man who treats his wife badly. Williams tells this man that he has a reason to 
treat his wife better. The first reason he comes up with is: Because she is your wife. This 
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has little effect on the man who replies by saying that he doesnt care about that. Williams 
is persistent and tries to give other answers, but he finds nothing in the mans motivational 
set that gives him an internal reason to start treating his wife better. Many things may, as 
Williams concedes, be said about this man. We may call him ungrateful, inconsiderate, 
hard, sexist, nasty, brutal, etc. But, Williams claims, we cannot say that he has a reason to 
change. This line of thought seems, we can note once again, to be dependent on a 
conflation of normative and motivating reasons. It might, indeed, be agreed that this man 
has no motivating reason, or motivation, to do what we want him to do, but it seems 
obvious that he has a normative reason to treat his wife better: she suffers from his 
treatment. And, that we call him all those things that Williams mentions has, it seems, to 
do with our sensibly taking there to be a reason for him to change his ways; his failure to 
recognise this reason is exactly what makes him ungrateful, inconsiderate, hard and so on.  
       That the externalist will claim that this man has this reason is recognised by Williams. 
But, despite this, he claims, concerning the expected reason-statement, that one of the 
mysterious things about the denial of internalism lies precisely in the fact that it leaves it 
quite obscure when this form of words is thought to be appropriate31. If Williams really, 
as he claims, thinks that externalism leaves it obscure when it is appropriate to say that 
somebody has a reason, then how does he know that the externalist will say that this man 
has this reason? He should, if he thought that the idea of external reasons really is 
mysterious, have said that he has no idea of what the externalist would say about this man 
and his reasons. We can also note that Williams, in claiming this, again seems only to be 
concerned with how the word reason is to be used properly. This is strange. When we 
consider this case what we think is not merely that it appears appropriate, as a way of 
describing this situation, to use this form of words. What we consider, or have beliefs 
about, is, rather, the following normative question: Does this man have a reason to change 
his ways? Most of us would say that it obvious that he does. Our beliefs, then, about this 
situation are, in other words, not merely beliefs about language; they are normative beliefs, 
which is a distinct kind of beliefs.  
      Williams then asks:  
 
[I]f it is thought to be appropriate [to say that this man has this reason], what is 
supposed to make it appropriate ()? The question is: what is the difference 
supposed to be between saying that the agent has a reason to act more 
considerately, and saying one of the many other things we can say to people 
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whose behaviour does not accord with what we think it should be? As, for 
instance, that it would be better if they acted otherwise.32        
 
As I have already said, it is, I believe, the very fact that we believe that the man in example 
fails to respond to the reason he has that makes us say those other things about him. This is 
the difference between saying that he has a reason and saying those other things about him. 
And, to say that it is better to do what one has reason to do is, or so I take it, to trivially say 
that one has reason to do what one has reason to do. The question whether we have reason 
to do what we have reason to do is just plainly silly. What makes it appropriate to say, or to 
believe, that this man has reason to change his ways is the normative fact that the well-
being of others matters. This, I believe, is best taken as being an irreducibly normative 
truth. We need not give any further explanations why the well-being of others is something 
that we should care about. Nor is any such explanation possible to give. Yet, it is a fact that 
the well-being of people matters. These two claims, namely 
 
 (M) The well-being of others matters 
and 
 (R) We have reason to care about the well-being of others 
 
do not seem to report different things. Rather, it seems that to say that the well-being of 
others matters, is to say that we have reason to care about the well-being of others. If we 
believe (M) and (R), these beliefs must, I have claimed, if they are to be really normative, 
be irreducibly normative, and if these beliefs or claims are true, then it is appropriate to say 
that this man has reason to start treating his wife better.  
      So, the reason why the man in the example should change his ways is the fact that the 
way that he treats his wife causes her to suffer. But, the fact that his behaviour has this 
effect on her is not a normative fact, but a non-normative empirical fact. This non-
normative fact is, however, one that has normative significance. Compare: 
 
 (E) The way this man treats his wife makes her suffer 
with 
(N) Because (E) is true, this man has a reason to stop treating his wife as he 
does  
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Although (E) is the fact which is the reason why this man should change, (E) is not a 
normative claim. Understanding and knowing (E) to be true does not, therefore, necessarily 
involve understanding and knowing (N) to be true. But, understanding and knowing (N) to 
be true would involving understanding (E).  
      There may be different kinds of reasons for caring about the well-being of others. 
Many would accept that we have prudential reasons to care about others, since if we do, 
then our own lives are likely to go better. We could, in other words, have purely egoistic 
reasons to care about others. It may, though, seem more obvious that we have moral, or 
altruistic, reasons to care about others. We should, in other words, care about others for 
their sake and not (merely) for our own. There need not be, we should note though, any 
conflict involved here. We can have reasons to care about others for both their and our own 
sake. That we, as the internalist wants us believe, only have reason to care about the well-
being of others if we do care about them or are motivated to promote their well-being, 
seems hard to believe.  
 
Normativity 
 
If we suppose that we can be able to explain, using only non-normative concepts, what it is 
to say that the man in the example above has reason to treat his wife better, we are likely, 
like Williams, to find claims about external reasons mysterious. But, if we do not wish to 
abandon the normativity of normative concepts and/or claims, we should give up this hope 
(if we have it). We can appeal to: 
 
The normativity of normative claims: Because normative claims are normative 
they cannot be reduced to non-normative claims  
 
This claim might seem trivial, but it shouldnt be taken that way. Rather, it should be taken 
as saying something important about normative concepts. I shall now explain why this is 
so. 
    Now, Williams takes the if-part of claim C1 above to have normative force. This was the 
claim that 
 
C1: A has a reason to do x if A could, after going through sound deliberation, 
be motivated to do x 
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Is the if in C1 relevantly normative? As already indicated, and as Williams notes, all the 
normativity to be found in a claim like C1 must, on the internalist view, be found in the 
condition of there being a sound deliberative route from the agents present motivations. 
As I remarked above, this may, given Williams idea of sound deliberation, seem like a 
surprisingly weak and narrow view of what normativity consists in, or where, to borrow an 
expression from Korsgaard, the source/sources of normativity is/are to be found. Williams 
writes: 
 
Unless a claim to the effect that an agent has a reason to [do x] can go beyond 
what the agent is already motivated to do  that is go beyond his already being 
motivated to [do x]  then certainly the term will have too narrow a definition. 
A has a reason to [do x] means more than A is presently disposed to [do 
x].33  
 
As Williams points out, it is obviously false that a claim like A has a reason to do x 
merely states that A presently is disposed to do x for that is only to say that the agent has 
some motivating reason do x. So, if we were to say that A has a reason to do x means that 
x could, after going through sound deliberation, still be motivated to do x, would we 
include the important element of normativity that Williams doesnt wish to lose? In order 
to try to answer this question we can consider the following remarks of Williams on the 
issue (which, in part, repeats a point that weve already discussed): 
 
The claim that somebody can get to the conclusion that he should [do x] () 
by a sound deliberate route involves, in my view, at least correcting any errors 
of fact and reasoning on the agents view of the matter. () We are allowed to 
change- that is improve and correct- his beliefs of fact and his reasoning in 
saying what he has reason to do. That is already enough for the notion to be 
normative.34 
 
As all we are saying is that A could be motivated to do x after having deliberated soundly, 
it does not seem to be the case that we are saying something relevantly normative, or 
something that has much normative force. Williams view on what normativity consists in 
appears to be far too narrow. Differently put, we can say that we seem, on internalism, to 
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have done away with the distinctively normative force of the claim that A has a reason to 
do x.  
 
Naturalism 
 
If we take A has a reason to do x to mean when knowing all the relevant facts x is what 
A is most motivated to do or doing x would help fulfil a desire that A wouldnt lose after 
knowing all the relevant facts, then our theory will be analytically reductive. Such a view, 
we should agree, has little appeal. Therefore we might instead say that, though these 
sentences dont have the same meaning, they report the same fact. This would then be a 
non-analytical but still reductive version of internalism. Both analytical and non-analytical 
versions of internalism are naturalist views.  
      We should, I believe, reject all forms of naturalism. What distinguishes normative 
claims, and concepts, from other claims, and concepts, is, as I have claimed, precisely and 
notably the fact that they are normative, whereas non-normative claims or concepts are not. 
We should, therefore, reject naturalism. Though this is far from a knock-down argument 
against naturalism, I do, as Ive said, believe that there is reason for thinking that this claim 
isnt trivial. What I think that this claim does is to summarise, or catch the essence of, three 
other arguments against naturalism.  
        First we can, using Moores strategy35, say that it appears to make sense, upon hearing 
that somebody is motivated in a certain way after going through a sound deliberative 
process, to ask whether he really has a reason to act as he now is motivated to act. It is, we 
could claim, an open question whether this person has this reason; it could, even by those 
who fully understand the concepts involved in making the claim that Williams makes, be 
intelligibly questioned whether the person has this reason. This, we might claim, shows 
that the internalist formula for what it is to have a reason isnt a definitional truth, and thus, 
we could claim, the analytically reductive version of internalism is refuted.  
      The internalist may reply that we should revise our use of reason so that it no longer 
becomes an open question whether someone who, after having deliberated soundly on the 
facts, is motivated to do x, has reason to do x. Following Williams it might be claimed that 
this is the only intelligible sense in which the term reason can be used. But, this would 
not be a good reply. It assumes that we need a reductionist view and that we cannot 
understand what reason means if it is taken to be an irreducibly normative concept. We 
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need not, as Ive argued, assume this. Irreducibly normative concepts can and, we should 
agree, do make sense.   
      Further we could, inspired by Sidgwick36, say that if we, by the words A has a reason 
to do x, mean no more than that A would, under certain circumstances, desire to do x, 
we cannot be claiming to say anything significant when we say that the internalist view is 
true. If these two claims meant the same thing this would mean that I, if I had accepted the 
internalist view, could not in any interesting sense reason in the following way: 
 
 (1) I am now, after having deliberated on the facts, motivated to do x. 
 (2) I, therefore, have a reason to do x. 
 
(2) merely would be a restatement of the premise (1). My reasoning would be unacceptably 
trivial. This argument hits both analytically and non-analytically reductive views. On a 
non-analytical view (2) does, even though it doesnt have the same meaning than (1), 
report the same fact as (1) and can therefore not be taken to be a significant conclusion. 
Parfit, when discussing this37, concludes that reductionists are, when trying to explain 
normative reasoning, committed to the following kind of reasoning: 
 
 (3) Jumping would get me what I most want. 
 (4) As another way of reporting this fact, I could say that I have most reason to 
 jump, or that I should jump. 
 
Since (4), even though it by these internalists is taken to be a normative claim, does not 
report any fact that is different from (3), they must accept that (4) is the only thing they can 
infer from (3). In a discussion of this argument, Parfit makes the following remarks: 
 
Like the analytically reductive view, this account grotesquely distorts my 
reasoning. When I conclude that I should jump, I am not merely redescribing 
my arguments premise. I am drawing a quite different conclusion. If my 
conclusion merely redescribed the causal fact described in (3), it could not be 
normative.38     
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The consequence of accepting naturalism, Parfit claims, is that we abandon normativity. 
Naturalism fails, in other words, because it describes and/or explains our normative beliefs 
in a way that abolishes the normative content of these beliefs. 
       It may now objected that while this may show that normative concepts arent 
reducible, it does not show that normative properties cannot be natural properties. They 
could be some sort of natural properties that arent reducible to natural properties because 
they supervene on natural properties. Because something has certain natural and non-
normative properties it has some normative natural property. This could, as it appeals to 
the irreduciblity of normative properties, be considered to be a realist view. Among the 
properties of things there are normative natural properties that are just as much part of the 
fabric of the world as any other properties. We gain knowledge of these properties by 
causal interaction with them, just as we gain knowledge of other real properties by means 
of causal interaction with them.  
      Such a view, I believe, fails because it misunderstands the nature of normative 
properties. There is a deep difference between natural and normative properties that we 
should recognise. Our normative beliefs do, as well, differ from our non-normative beliefs 
in a significant way. What I mean by this will become apparent as we go along. I will not 
argue against naturalist realism any further here39. For now I will assume that this kind of 
naturalist realism fails, and get back to our main target, which is internalism. 
 
Non-reductive internalism  
 
Shouldnt we, then, claim that on a truly normative version of internalism, A has a reason 
to do x has the implication that if A, after having gone through sound deliberation, would 
be motivated to do x, then a further, and distinct, fact would obtain, namely the normative 
fact hat A should do x? It would then be the case that the counterfactual claim about As 
possible motivation(s) would have normative force because it would be the source of 
normativity. This would be a non-reductive form of the internalist view, one on which the 
crucial element of normativity is not vanished. Because certain motivational fact obtain, 
another kind of fact obtains as well: we have reasons to act in certain ways. Parfit, who 
considers this possibility, suggests the following formulation of the view at hand: 
 
(A) Some acts really are rational. There are facts about these acts, and their 
relation to our motivation, which give us reasons to act in these ways. 
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He compares this with realism, on which the following is true: 
 
(B) Some aims are really worth achieving. There are facts about these aims 
which give us reasons to want to achieve them. 
 
A lot of writers have, Parfit notes, been sceptical towards claims like (B) because of their 
metaphysical implications; (B) commits its defender to believing in irreducibly normative 
truths. The same is, however, true of (A). (A), being non-reductive, claims that since 
certain motivational facts obtains, other normative facts obtain as well. By making this 
claim, the non-reductive internalist commits herself to at least one kind of irreducibly 
normative truth (namely the one just mentioned). This undermines her reason for claiming 
that there can be no truths about what is worth achieving. Thus, Parfit concludes, (B) is no 
less plausible than (A).40  
      The following is meant to be an alternative version of the argument just presented: 
Suppose the internalist appeals to an ideal-observer version of internalism. Then she 
might say the following: 
 
(C) Some acts really are rational. These are the acts that an ideal observer 
would be motivated to perform, or would approve of, if he knew all the 
relevant facts about given situations.41 
 
These acts might be acts that Hares archangel42 would be motivated to perform. (C) 
incorporates an element of motivation by stating that we have reason to do what the ideal 
observer would want us to do. The argument could here be that, while it is true that (C) 
speaks of a motivational element, this addition is redundant. What is relevant is, as I have 
already argued, why the ideal observer would be so motivated. It seems that it would be 
enough just to say that we have reasons to act in certain ways, without adding that the 
archangel would be motivated by certain beliefs or facts. And as (C), like (B), commits its 
defender to belief in at least one normative truth (i.e. the truth of (C), (B) would be no less 
plausible than (C).  
     The archangel, we can suppose, is substantively rational. Williams appeals, as we have 
seen, only to procedural rationality. Claiming that somebodys reasoning is not a sound 
deliberation is at least mildly normative, as the appeal to soundness is slightly 
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normative43. But, since what, on Williams view, seems to be of most importance is the 
process of deliberation that leads somebody to think that he should act in a certain way, his 
theory is perhaps best seen as a theory of practical reasoning rather than of practical 
reasons. Williams, I believe, would reject both (A) and (C). He would claim that, though 
there are no acts that we have any actual reasons (in the sense that (A) and (C) seems to 
imply that there are) to perform, there are ways of coming to believe that we have reasons 
to act in certain ways that are less rational or desirable than others. Williams himself writes 
that the internal reasons conception is concerned with the agents rationality44. In some 
ways, then, his theory seems to be only about instrumental rationality. 
 
The relation between reasons and motivation 
 
I have claimed that internalism conflates normative and motivating reasons. Williams 
would, of course, disagree. In fact, one of Williams arguments in favour of internalism 
does focus on the relation between these two kinds of reasons. We shall now examine that 
argument. After first having quoted what Williams says in its entirety, I will, step by step, 
go through that which he says, pointing out several things that I take there to be reason to 
reject. Williams writes: 
 
The () point is the interrelation of explanatory and normative reasons. It must be a 
mistake to simply separate explanatory and normative reasons. If it is true that A has a 
reason to [do x], then it must be possible that he should [do x] for that reason; and if 
he does act for that reason, then that reason will be the explanation of his acting. So 
the claim that he has a reason to [do x] () introduces the possibility of that reason 
being an explanation; namely if the agent accepts that claim (more precisely; if he 
accepts that he has more reason to [do x] than to do anything else). This is a basic 
connection. When the reason is an explanation of his action, then of course it will be, 
in some form in his [motivational set] S, because certainly- and nobody denies this- 
what he actually does has to be explained by his S.   
Internalist theory explains how it is that the agents accepting the truth of There 
is a reason for you to [do x] could lead to his acting, and the reason would thus 
explain his action. It is obvious on the internalist view how this works. But suppose 
we take the externalist view, and so accept that it can be true that A has a reason to 
[do x] without there being any shadow or trace of that presently in his S. What is it 
that the agent comes to believe when he comes to believe that he has a reason to [do 
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x]? If he becomes persuaded of this supposedly external truth, so that the reason does 
then enter his S, what is it that he comes to believe? This question presents a 
challenge to the externalist theorist?45 
 
Most importantly, whats wrong about this argument is that it rests on, what seems to be, a 
false assumption about normative reasons. Lets take it from the beginning. Williams 
begins: 
 
The point is the interrelation of explanatory and normative reasons. It must be 
a mistake to simply separate explanatory and normative reasons.  
 
To this, I reply: No; when we are talking about these different kinds of reasons, we are 
trying to say completely different things. Both kinds of reasons are, though in distinct 
ways, explanatory. Normative reasons are explanatory in that they explain why we should 
act in certain ways; they are explanatory in what we can call a justificatory sense. 
However, they are not, and need not be, explanatory in the sense that explanatory reasons 
are; they need not explain why we act as we do. The first kind of reasons functions as 
answers to normative questions, while the second kind answers causal or motivational 
and/or psychological questions. 
      Once again I would like to emphasize how Williams seems conflate normative and 
motivating reasons in a mistaken way. Consider this remark of his: 
 
If something can be a reason for action, then it could be someones reason for acting 
on a particular occasion, and it would then figure in an explanation of that action. 46 
 
This could, depending on how you want to understand it, be accepted by the externalist. 
When explaining why somebody acted as he did, we could, I believe, say that he acted 
because he believed that some fact obtained, and this belief could be the reason that made 
it true that he acted as he should have. This doesnt mean that the reason itself, or the 
normative truth that something gave a person a reason to act, has any causal power. So, the 
following need not be considered as being a critique of the externalist position (the 
question that Williams discusses in the passage I here quote is whether Owen, who doesnt 
want to join the army, could nevertheless have reason to do so): 
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Now no external reason statement could by itself offer an explanation of anyones 
action. Even if it were true (whatever that might turn out to mean) that there was a 
reason for Owen to join the army, that fact by itself would never explain anything that 
Owen did, not even his joining the army.47 
 
Returning to the passage we are looking at, Williams continues:  
 
If it is true that A has a reason to [do x], then it must be possible that he should 
[do x] for that reason; and if he does act for that reason, then that reason will 
be the explanation of his acting.  
 
Here Williams conflates a more plausible claim with the one that I have just rejected. The 
plausible claim is that our theory must allow for the possibility of us acting for good 
reasons.48 But, this is not the same claim as the claim that these normative reasons, in a 
stronger sense, explain why we act. What explains why we act is rather our believing that 
we have these reasons (or something like that). As we can note, Williams himself have 
actually said things that go badly together with the claims he here makes. In Internal and 
External Reasons he says that we can have false beliefs about what reasons we have49. 
More importantly, Willaims also says that [t]he difference between false and true belief 
on the agents part cannot alter the form of the explanation which will be appropriate to his 
action50 If the agent falsely believes that she has some reason and acts accordingly, then 
how could this acting be explained by this reason? It couldnt because there is, in this case, 
no such reason. What explains her acting is rather her being motivated by her belief that 
she has this reason. In this case we can explain her acting and we dont appeal to any 
normative reason in doing so. We, instead, appeal to her belief about a normative reason. 
Now, Williams claims that, when explaining why agents act as they do, the form of 
explanation isnt altered in cases where agents have true or false beliefs. The question, 
then, is: why should we appeal to normative reasons when explaining agents actions when 
these agents act on true normative beliefs? Even if there are no such things as normative 
reasons, we could, I have claimed, still explain peoples actions. And, if people always 
acted as they have most reason to act, we still wouldnt need to appeal to these agents 
normative reasons when explaining their actions, only their beliefs about reasons. So, it 
doesnt follow, as Williams seems to think, that   
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the claim that he has a reason to [do x] () introduces the possibility of that 
reason being an explanation; namely if the agent accepts that claim (more 
precisely; if he accepts that he has more reason to [do x] than to do anything 
else). This is a basic connection.  
 
Here, again, Williams seems to be confusing the two different claims for being one and the 
same. On the one hand we have the claim that a normative reason can explain why we act 
as we do, while, on the other hand, we have the claim that it is the fact that an agent 
believes that she has reason to act in some way that explains her acting. So, what Williams 
takes to be a basic connection is not a basic connection. We can, I believe, deny the 
following as well: 
 
When the reason is an explanation of his action, then of course it will be, in 
some form in his S, because certainly- and nobody denies this51- what he 
actually does has to be explained by his S.52 
 
Now, it may be true that what an agent does is explained by her S. But that doesnt mean a 
normative reason has to be in somebodys S in any other form than as the content of a 
belief. Therefore, the reason itself need not be referred to in explaining the agents acting. 
Only the belief (perhaps taken together with some desire) needs to be referred to.  
      Williams continues:  
 
Internalist theory explains how it is that the agents accepting the truth of 
There is a reason for you to [do x] could lead to his acting, and the reason 
would thus explain his action. It is obvious on the internalist view how this 
works. 
 
This may not be true either. Although the internalist can explain how an agent coming to 
believe that she has reason to act in some way may explain her acting accordingly, this 
again doesnt mean that it is the reason that explains why she acts. To say that somebody 
has a reason to do something, on the internalist view, is to say that there is a sound 
deliberative route from this persons S to the conclusion that she should do this thing. 
What explains this agent doing this thing would then rather be her having deliberated and 
having decided to act. The deliberation may not have been, in Williams sense sound, but 
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this shouldnt alter the form of explanation of the agents acting. So, if the agent had 
deliberated soundly, then we would have explained her acting in a similar way. In neither 
of these explanations do we need to appeal to internal reasons in order to explain the 
agents acting.  
     Williams then turns to considering externalism and writes: 
 
But suppose we take the externalist view, and so accept that it can be true that 
A has a reason to [do x] without there being any shadow or trace of that 
presently in his S. What is it that the agent comes to believe when he comes to 
believe that he has a reason to [do x]? If he becomes persuaded of this 
supposedly external truth, so that the reason does then enter his S, what is it 
that he comes to believe? This question presents a challenge to the externalist 
theorist.  
 
What the agent comes to believe is precisely that he has a good reason to act. It is, I 
believe, as simple as that. Such a belief could, and/or would, be irreducibly normative. We 
dont have to believe anything further. This possibility is not one which Williams, at all, 
seems to have considered. He writes: 
 
What is it that one comes to believe when one comes to believe that there is reason for 
him to [do x], if it is not the proposition, or something that entails that proposition, 
that if he deliberated rationally, he would be motivated to act accordingly?53 
 
Williams here seems to assume that a reductionist answer necessarily is what we are 
looking for. This should not be presupposed. To answer Williams question we might say 
that its, again, as simple as this: the agent believe that he has a reason to act. That is what 
it is to have a normative belief.  
 
Acting for a reason 
 
The argument of Williams just discussed, I have argued, fails. There was, however, one 
thing that he said that I took to be plausible taken at face value, namely the claim that  
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If it is true that A has a reason to do x, then it must be possible that he should 
do x for that reason 
 
We can, following Korsgaard54, call this The internalism requirement. If we were to accept 
this claim, would this cause any problems for our externalist view?  
      Dancy, who defends an externalist view of reasons, thinks so. The problem, he claims, 
surfaces if we accept a psychologistic55 theory of motivation/motivating reasons. Dancys 
worry is that the combination of externalism and a psychologistic theory renders us 
incapable of acting for a good reason56. He writes: 
 
[T]he psychologistic story fails to meet at least two of the main constraints on 
accounts of motivating reasons. Either it fails to show how it is possible for the 
reason in light of which we acting to have been among the reasons in favour of 
acting, or it fails to show how it is possible more generally for a motivating 
reason to be a good reason for acting.57  
    
So, if the fact that jumping out of the window would save my life is a good reason for 
jumping, this cannot, Dancy claims, on the psychologistic story be a motivating reason 
since it is a fact/truth and not a belief. If my motivating reason for jumping was that I 
believed that it would save my life then this motivating reason and the normative reason 
are two separate reasons, i.e. the motivating reason is a belief while the normative reason is 
a truth/fact. A belief about a fact is something else than the fact itself. Therefore it seems 
that on a psychologistic account of motivating reasons normative reasons cannot be 
motivating reasons. This would violate the internalism requirement. Thus if we accept the 
internalism-requirement, externalism and accept psychologism, we here, or so Dancy 
thinks, have a problem.  
      What, then, should we make of this? Well, suppose jumping would save my life and 
that I believe this. Because I believe it I jump. Was the normative reason for me to jump 
something else than my motivating reason for jumping? That I believe that jumping would 
save my life is surely something else than the fact that jumping would save me. However, 
the content of my belief is the same as the fact that jumping would save my life. Lets call 
this fact p. So when I come to believe that p, then p is the content of my belief and if p is 
true, then I have a true belief. The normative reason for jumping is the truth of p. Whether 
I have a good reason to jump does, in other words, depend (in part) on the truth of p. Now, 
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as Williams noted,58 it doesnt matter whether our beliefs are true or false when it comes to 
their ability to motivate us. False beliefs motivates just as true beliefs do. It is also the case 
that our rational ability to reason sometimes makes us irrationally jump to conclusions, 
which might make us act on false assumptions. Motivating and normative reasons differ, I 
have said, in the sense that when I act intentionally we can always say that there is a 
motivating reason explaining my acting, whereas there might not be any good reason to act 
in such a way. This suggests that whether I have a normative reason to act in a certain way 
depends on something else than whether I have a motivating reason for acting when acting. 
The condition for there to be a motivating reason, I have said, is that I act intentionally. 
Differently put, we can say that whenever I act intentionally there is some motivating 
reason explaining my act. Whether I have a good reason to act depends, roughly, on facts 
about the given situation. If, for example, Paul is being attacked by a tiger he has a good 
reason to run.    
      What I think that we need to do is to question the authority of the internalism 
requirement. Or, more precisely, we should, if we wish to keep it, see if there is a better 
way of formulating it. My suggestion is that it should read: 
 
The improved internalism requirement: Something cannot be a normative 
reason unless it can be the content of a belief that is capable of being, or being 
a part of, an explanatory reason for someone to act.   
 
If we allow this change then the problem appears to be solved. Remember again that 
consideration of normative reasons and of motivating reasons are two different things in 
the sense that when we are speaking of good reasons to act we are not trying to explain 
why someone would or might act in a certain way; we are trying to explain why this person 
should act in the given way. It is only, I would say, if normative and motivating reason are 
incapable of being related in any plausible way that we seriously need to doubt whether it 
makes sense to speak of normative reasons as something distinct from motivating reasons.  
      Remember what I, at the beginning, said about the difference between explanatory and 
motivating reasons. When we speak of explanatory reasons we are trying to explain why 
someone acted as he/she did. The most common way to do this is to appeal to the agents 
motivating reasons. When we ask why Paul is running we will most likely expect to hear, 
as an answer, Pauls motivating reason, namely that a tiger is chasing him. So from Pauls 
perspective the reason that he is running is that a tiger is chasing him; because he believes 
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that this is true he runs. Now, if a tiger is chasing you, you do seem to have a good reason 
to run, so Paul is acting for what seems to be a good reason. It is, then, the content of his 
belief that he is being chased by a tiger that motivates him. Whats important here is the 
content of his belief rather than the fact that he believes something, even if there here is a 
dependency-relation. Had he not believed that he is chased by a tiger, he would not have 
been moved to act59.  
      You can act for a good reason since the fact that you believe that you have this reason 
can motivate you to act. What explains why you acted in certain way might be that you had 
a certain belief. What motivated you was the content of this belief and if you didnt falsely 
believe that you had a good reason to act, then we could say that you acted for a good 
reason.  
 
Why reasons for having desires might be more important than reasons for acting  
 
Reasons for having certain desires are, I believe, of greater importance than reasons for 
acting. The same might be true for reasons for believing as well. Why is this so? Suppose 
that we think that the internalist theory of reasons for actions is true. Reasons for actions 
are all, on this view, provided by desires. If we assume that this is a correct description of 
having reasons for acting, it is still perfectly reasonable to ask whether we have any 
reasons to have these desires. We could, in other words, believe that the internalist-model 
gives a correct analysis of reasons for acting, and still think that this doesnt matter much. 
What is most important, we could say, is the question of whether we have any reason to 
have the desires that would be fulfilled if we were to act in certain ways. Those who accept 
the belief/desire-theory of intentional action and therefore believe that desire is a necessary 
condition for action should certainly accept this.  
      Now, remember that internalism is a development of Humes theory of practical 
reason. The Humean believes that desires, or passions in Humes terminology, cannot be 
contrary to reason. The internalist doesnt have to say this. There can be desire-based 
reasons for having certain desires. Desires that we have because we have another, more 
fundamental, desire can be called instrumental desires. There can, as we can note, be long 
chains of instrumental desires. We should also, and more importantly, note that these 
chains must end somewhere. At the end of the chain there has to be a desire for something 
for its own sake. Such a desire would be an intrinsic desire, or a final desire, and here 
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the internalist has to stay true to his Humean roots. He must, on internalism, claim that 
these desires are desires that we have no reason to have or not to have.  
      The internalist may object to what I say here. There can be desire-based reasons for 
having intrinsic desires, he might say, and point our attention to, for instance, the, in our 
discussion already mentioned, paradox of hedonism. This, we said, was the claim that, 
though pleasure is the only thing that actually is of value, we ought to desire other things 
than pleasure for their own sake, for if we dont, we will be less successful when trying to 
achieve our hedonistic aim. Since we have an intrinsic desire for pleasure, we have reason 
to do what is most likely to bring us pleasure and that is to intrinsically desire other things 
than pleasure. Hence, the internalist may conclude, we can, on internalism, have reasons to 
have intrinsic desires. But these intrinsic desires are not intrinsic desires in the most 
important sense. I take the most relevant intrinsic desires to be those desires that are 
ultimately grounded in the desirable features in the object(s) of desire. These are the 
desires that the internalist cannot claim that we have any reason to have. The reason for us 
to desire pleasure is, we can note, exactly such an example.      
      Some would claim that the only thing we have intrinsic desires for is pleasure and/or 
happiness. I believe that we should reject this claim. It is perhaps true of some people, but 
many of us desire other things than happiness for their own sake. Examples of things 
desired for their own sake could include knowledge, a morally commendable lifestyle, 
friendship, excellence in arts or sports, posthumous fame, beauty, and so on. Whether these 
particular things actually are desirable or valuable for their own sake is something that I 
will not discuss here, even though I believe that some or all of these things are. Neither 
will I argue here for the claim that we desire other things than happiness for their own 
sake60.  
      Now, as we can note, it appears counter-intuitive to think that at the end of our chains 
of desires there are always desires that we have no reasons to have. As Parfit points out, 
even Hume seems to grant this in a passage of the Treatise where he seems to forget his 
own theory. In this passage, Hume writes: 
 
Ask a man why he uses exercises; he will answer because he desires to keep 
his health. If you then enquire why he desires health, he will readily reply 
because sickness is painful. If you push your enquires further and desire a 
reason why he hates pain, it is impossible that he can ever give any. This is an 
ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object () beyond this it is an 
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absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress in 
infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired. 
Something must be desirable on its own account.61     
 
Parfit responds to this in the following way: 
 
For desirable Hume should have written desired. Something is desirable if 
it has features that give us reasons to want this thing. Hume denied that there 
can be such reasons.62 
 
What I have claimed is this: even if it would be true that a reason to act in a certain way is 
provided by the fact that this act would help fulfil a desire one has, it would still be very 
much possible, and important, to ask why one should have this desire. This question will 
be especially important if we accept the belief/desire-theory of intentional action. To 
answer by citing a further desire will be unsatisfactory because at every chain of 
instrumental desires there will be an intrinsic desire. Having a certain desire cannot, I 
believe, give you a reason to have any other desires in any direct way.  
      If you desire a certain end, you might have reason to desire the means, but this reason 
would not be provided by the first desire. This reason would rather be provided by the fact 
that the end is worth achieving, or that desiring the means would make you more 
successful in pursuing the end. Consider the following example. You desire to achieve 
excellence in some sport. The proper means to this could be working out and going to 
practice several days a week. Feeling no desire to work out and practice will certainly 
cause nuisance. It can, of course, be questioned whether you have any reason to desire the 
end in question. If there is such a reason, it is most certainly not provided by a further 
desire.  
      If there is no reason to pursue a certain end, then how could my desiring this end 
provide me with a reason to desire the means to the end? If it would be better if I didnt 
desire the end, then it seems that it also would be better if I dont desire the means. 
Imagine that you know that there are reasons against achieving a certain end that you 
desire. You strongly desire to experience the effects of a drug you are addicted to. The 
voice of reason tells you that achieving this would be bad for you, as this drug messes up 
your sense of reality. But, since you are addicted, you strongly desire to take the drug, 
which is the means to the end, i.e. to get into this state of euphoric delusion. Do you have 
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reason to the desire the means to your desired end? The answer seems to be No. Contrast 
this with an example in which youre ill and you are thinking about taking a certain drug 
because you believe that it will help you achieve the end of getting you well again. You 
here desire the end and you seem to have reason to desire the means. Doesnt it appear to 
be the fact that you will get well, rather than the fact that you desire this end, that gives you 
reason to desire the means?    
      Some would say that we should, or perhaps always do, necessarily desire the means to 
the ends we desire. This is a little too strong. Achieving a certain end might be desirable, 
but since the sacrifice involved in pursuing the end would be too great, you might not 
desire to take the proper means to your end, and, besides, you might actually have reasons 
to abstain from pursuing the end.  
 
Rational aims and intentions 
 
Our aims are rational insofar as they are supported by reasons, and if our aims are rational 
we have reason to do what will help achieve these aims. But, we have these reasons 
because these aims are rational, not simply in virtue of our having the aims in question. We 
cannot, in that way, create reasons; we cannot merely decide what reasons we have. But, 
our decisions and/or intentions may have consequences that create reasons. Because I 
intend to go on a trip, I buy tickets. Now that I have bought the tickets I have reason to use 
them. If I dont I shall have wasted my money. But here it wasnt the intention that was the 
reason. One cannot, in Michael Bratmans terms, bootstrap63 reasons into existence. If we 
could, then I could, just by intending it, suddenly have a reason to steal your wallet. If 
youd complain, Id just say that I had a reason to steal it-I intended to. Its obvious that 
you need not accept this. 
 
Reasons, beliefs and the appeal to consistency 
 
Suppose now that you thought you had a good reason to act and therefore acted, when it 
really wasnt the case that you had this reason. If you have false beliefs it may be rational 
to do what you have no reason to do. This does, however, depend on which kind of belief 
of yours that is false. If you have false your non-normative beliefs, this may not render 
your acting irrational. Thus if you falsely believe that the room is on fire, you are acting 
rationally if you leave it. You had an apparent reason and you responded to it. But your 
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belief that the room is on fire may be irrational though. If you feel no heat, see no flames 
or smell no smoke, you have no reason to believe that the room is on fire and your belief is 
irrational. But as the building you are in is on fire, it may be good that you believe that 
your room, which is not yet on fire, is in flames. Believing this has good consequences in 
that it makes you jump, which is something you have reason to do. Does it mean that you 
did have reason to believe what there was no apparent reason to believe? If it does, it 
cannot, though, make it true that your belief was rational. I shall return to this issue later in 
this section. First I will say a little about beliefs as such. 
      Beliefs can be either non-normative or normative64. Non-normative beliefs are beliefs 
about what is the case. Normative beliefs are beliefs about what ought to be the case, i.e. 
beliefs about what we ought to do, or want. What about beliefs about values? One way of 
understanding such beliefs is this: If I believe that something is of value, then I believe that 
there are reasons to care65 about this thing that are provided by features, or properties, that 
the thing in question has. If, for instance, I believe that living is good, then I believe that 
there are reasons for me to want to live. These, I am inclined to think, are basically two 
different ways of reporting the same belief. Compare: 
 
 (V) Suffering is bad 
with  
 (N) We have reason to avoid suffering 
 
Since these two claims do not appear to have different truth-makers, and since no new 
information appears to be given in (N) that is not given in (V), we need here not have two 
different discussions about these kinds of beliefs. I will therefore here only talk about 
normative beliefs, as I think that evaluative beliefs can be understood in terms of 
normative beliefs.66      
      We can note that particular normative beliefs always depend on non-normative beliefs 
in the end. Believing, for example, that I ought to jump out of the window in the example I 
called The fire depends on the belief that I would die if I were to stay in my hotel-room. 
That you most likely will be killed if youre caught by the flames is not a normative belief. 
It might be objected that some of our beliefs about what we ought to do depend instead on 
other normative beliefs. If I believe that I ought not to kill people, I might have this 
normative belief because I have the normative belief that killing is wrong. But believing 
that I ought not to kill anyone and believing that killing is wrong might be considered as 
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being the same thing. Better put we might say that that believing that murder is wrong 
implies that you believe that you ought not to kill anyone (at least under normal 
circumstances). Anyway, the belief that killing is wrong still has to depend on non-
normative beliefs. Something isnt just wrong; there is a dependency-relation between 
normative properties of things or acts and their natural, non-normative properties.  
      This is not to say that normative truths are reducible to non-normative truths though. 
The possible truth of x causes pain is another kind of truth than the possible truth of 
since x causes pain, we have a reason to avoid x. Believing that x causes pain seems to 
give us a reason to believe that we ought to avoid x, but it doesnt necessarily imply that 
anyone who believes that x will cause pain will believe that she ought to avoid x. The 
normative belief is separate from the non-normative. It does, however, depend on the non-
normative belief. We take, I have said, some facts to have normative significance. If we are 
taking them to have such significance, these facts matter and are, thus, reasons.  
        What, then, makes beliefs rational or irrational? The most obvious answer is the one 
already given: beliefs are rational when they are formed as a response to apparent reasons 
to believe-there is evidence counting in favour of believing something. This answer 
appeals to the origin of the beliefs. Thus if Jims fingerprints are on the murder-weapon, 
we seem to have reason to believe that he is the murderer. Suppose though that he actually 
is innocent. Are his fingerprints on the weapon still a reason for us to believe that he is 
guilty of this crime? It certainly seems so. It is an apparent reason to believe that he is the 
murderer and it makes believing that he is rational. So it seems that it can be rational to 
believe what is false if there are apparent reasons to believe. The truth in this case, we have 
said, is that Jim is innocent, but, given that the evidence seems to point in the opposite 
direction, it appears that believing the truth, in this case, would be irrational. Thus it can be 
rational to believe what is false. These kinds of evidential reasons for believing do not 
make the rationality of our beliefs truth-relative. After having looked at another way in 
which the origin of our beliefs can make our beliefs rational or irrational, we will consider 
intrinsically rational beliefs and I will then say more about the relation between what is 
true and our beliefs. 
      Now, another possible origin of beliefs is processes of theoretical reasoning, from 
which we can draw conclusions about what we take it to be rational to believe. We can call 
this The appeal to consistency as this has to do with how our beliefs go together with 
each other. If someone believes that the world was made in six days, it follows that this 
person, for the sake of consistency, ought rationally to believe that the world was made in 
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less than a week. Denying one of these claims while embracing the other would clearly be 
a rational failing. Does this mean that the person who believes the first claim, from which 
the other follows, has reason to believe that the world was made in less than a week? John 
Broome, from whom I have borrowed this example, certainly doesnt think so. He writes: 
 
No one ought to believe that the world was made in less than a week; the 
evidence is strongly against it. Even if you believe that the world was made in 
six days, still it is not the case that you ought to believe it was made in less 
than a week. Nevertheless, you ought (to believe that the world was made in 
less than a week, if you believe in six days). You can satisfy this requirement 
either by not believing that the world was made in six days or by believing that 
it was made in less than a week. As it happens, you ought to satisfy it the first 
way. You ought not to believe that the world was made in six days, even if you 
do.67 
 
Broome notes that there is no apparent reason, i.e. no evidence that counts in favour of 
believing that the world was made in six days, or less than a week. So you ought not to 
believe it; believing it would be irrational. But still, he claims, it may, in another sense, be 
the case that you ought to believe that the world was made in less than a week. What does 
Broome mean by this?  
      His point is this: normativity is not all about reasons. If we think so, we will overlook 
other important features being rational involves and falsely take things that arent reasons 
to be reasons. If you ought to do, desire or believe something, it is often the case that there 
is reason to do so, but that is not always true. There is, Broome claims, another sense of 
ought that shouldnt be confused with the sense just mentioned. This later sense in which 
there may be oughts has to do with the requirements of correct reasoning, theoretical or 
practical. You are, in Broomes terms, normatively required to believe what follows from 
your other beliefs. What Broome is talking about here is basically what I have called the 
appeal to consistency.  
       There may arise some confusion here. Though Broomes point is one I believe that we 
should accept, we can ask if it isnt true that we have reason to accept that there are such 
normative requirements that Broome talks about. If we have such a reason, i.e. we have 
reason to believe that we ought to believe what follows from our other beliefs, then it may 
seem that we really do have reason, in the case introduced above, to believe that the world 
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was made in less than a week. For if we have reason to accept the idea of normative 
requirements, then wouldnt that mean that we have reason to believe the consequences of 
constraining our beliefs in accordance with this idea of consistency? If we, in other words, 
have reason to have consistent beliefs, doesnt that mean that the person in the example has 
reason to believe that the world was made in less than a week?  
      Things, I believe, do, here, get a bit tricky. We can, in order to sort this out, distinguish 
reasons for accepting belief policies from reasons to believe particular propositions. If our 
beliefs arent consistent, this creates problems for us. That having consistent beliefs could 
have good consequences may, in other words, be a reason to accept the idea of normative 
requirements on our reasoning and beliefs. So we have, in this sense, reason to believe 
what follows from our other beliefs. But, as these other beliefs may be irrational, it is hard 
to believe that we have reason to believe some of the things that may follow from them. 
This may lead us to think that we only have reason to believe what follows from rational 
beliefs, but to think this would be to confuse reasons to accept belief policies with reasons 
to believe particular propositions. Compare this with how it can be rational to do what one 
has no reason to do if our belief that we have this reason depends on false non-normative 
beliefs. That we are being rational in such cases depends on our responding to apparent 
reasons. This, however, does not seem to be the case when it comes to beliefs that follow 
from other beliefs. That you believe that the world was made in less the six days is not an 
apparent reason to believe that it was made in less than a week. So the analogy breaks 
down here, but the point remains that it may be rational both to do and believe what one 
has no reason to do or believe. To think that beliefs could be reasons for having other 
beliefs would be to think that we, in a sense similar to the one rejected in an earlier section, 
could bootstrap reasons into existence; I start believing p and suddenly I have a reason 
that I didnt have before to believe q.  
 
Intrinsically rational beliefs and instrumentally rational beliefs 
  
Though the rationality of beliefs does to a large extent depend on the origins of the beliefs, 
this, Im inclined to think, isnt the only thing that could make beliefs rational, or 
irrational. When I talked about desires I said that it may be that desires can be intrinsically 
rational or irrational. What I then meant was that these desires were rational in virtue of the 
desirability of the objects of desire. If, to put it differently, something has features that give 
us reasons to want this thing for its own sake, then our desiring it would be intrinsically 
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rational. As I believe, beliefs, too, can be intrinsically rational or irrational. While what 
made desires intrinsically rational is facts about the object of desire, it is the content of a 
belief that can make that belief intrinsically rational, or perhaps sometimes more 
obviously, intrinsically irrational. On an internalist view this can, obviously, not be true 
when it comes to normative beliefs, but on the realist view that I am trying to defend it can. 
This, I think, is a strength that the realist position has. Suppose that somebody has no false 
beliefs about the nature of pain. Though this person knows how pain feels and what it is to 
suffer, this person believes that it is rational to want pain and suffering for its own sake. 
This, it may be objected, is an incredible example. Who, we might ask, would ever have 
such a belief? But this is no objection as it only proves that most of us are inclined to 
believe that such a belief is so irrational that no rational person could have it. This belief 
would be intrinsically irrational. If a belief is intrinsically rational, then it is the content of 
that belief that makes it so. 
       Suppose now that you believe something to be true. Does this make it intrinsically 
rational to believe that which you take to be true? If I, for instance, believe it to be true that 
the earth is flat, would failing to believe this be intrinsically irrational? I am now assuming 
that it is possible to believe something to be true without believing it. This may not be 
possible, but the point here is not to discuss that matter but to ask whether beliefs about the 
truth of beliefs one has have any relevance to the rationality of these beliefs. Some of our 
beliefs are such that we dont have any strong second-order beliefs about whether these 
first-order beliefs are true or false. If I believe that the weather is going to be nice next 
week, I might not feel that I have any good reason to believe that this belief of mine is true. 
Anyway, if such a thing is possible, it appears irrational to believe something to be true 
and still fail to believe it. This is not to say that a belief to the effect that some other belief 
p of ours is true always gives us reason to believe p. Rather, it is, at least in the case of 
beliefs about empirical facts, that which makes us believe that what we believe is true that 
gives us reason to believe that this belief of ours, whatever it may be, is true. This may 
appear to be a trivial point, but what I am trying to say is, basically, the following: Second-
order beliefs about the truth or falsity of our beliefs have impact on whether these first-
order beliefs are rational or not, but they are not, in the case of non-normative beliefs, 
reasons for believing or not believing the first-order beliefs in question.  
      Moreover, what is more important is this: whether a second-order belief about the truth 
of a first-order belief makes the first-order belief intrinsically rational depends on what this 
first-order belief is about and whether there can be better ways of finding out whether your 
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belief is rational. If our first-order belief is a belief about some empirical fact, then we can, 
instead of asking whether we believe that our belief is true, ask if there are any apparent 
reasons for believing that this fact obtains. But, when it comes to other kinds of beliefs, 
such as beliefs about values, normative truths, logical truths and so on, it may not be the 
case that we can test our beliefs in any other way than by asking ourselves whether these 
beliefs appear to be true or not. We can, knowing all there is to know about pleasure, ask, 
without making any linguistic or logical mistake, whether it is something that it is rational 
to want for its own sake. Does the fact that the answer clearly seems to be Yes give us 
reason to take it to be rational to believe this? My answer is Yes; that this obviously is 
the right answer makes it intrinsically rational to believe this. That something seems 
obviously true can also, I believe, in these cases be said to be at least an apparent reason to 
believe it.  
      There can also be reasons for believing some things that are provided by the 
consequences of believing. These reasons are reasons that we may be never aware of. But 
that, I believe, is not a problem. If we knew that it would be good for us to believe 
something that we have no apparent reason to believe we might, at best, start hoping that 
this, whatever it may be, was true. It is hard to believe that rational individuals could cause 
themselves to believe what there seems to be no apparent evidential reason to believe. 
Causing, if possible, oneself to believe such a thing would be, what we might call, rational 
self-deception. If I, for instance, enter a cave and the only exit that I believe the cave to 
have suddenly becomes blocked, I may not take myself to have any evidential reasons to 
believe that there is any other exit; its dark and, to the best of knowledge, the now blocked 
exist was the only way out. This may cause despair on my part. If I thought that there was 
some other way out, I would probably be more motivated to look for it. Thus I would, most 
likely, also be more successful when trying to do so. So, it seems that it would have good 
consequences if I believed that there was another way out. Trying to cause myself to 
believe this, therefore, appears rational. If having some belief has good consequences, then 
one, I believe, has reason for having this belief. We can call such a reason an instrumental 
reason for believing, and we can say that such beliefs can be instrumentally rational.     
      We have, then, four ways in which beliefs may be rational. Rational beliefs can be: 
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Reason-supported 
beliefs: 
 
The evidence points in favour of 
believing 
     
Consistency-required 
beliefs: 
  
Beliefs that follow from other beliefs 
we have 
 
     
Intrinsically rational 
beliefs: 
 
The content of the belief appears to 
give us reason to have this belief, 
or the belief appears obviously 
true 
 
 
Instrumentally rational 
beliefs: 
 
The effects of having the belief give 
us reasons to have it 
 
 
With this in mind we can turn our attention back to desires. 
 
Rational irrationality  
 
As I have already said, we desire some things for the sake of their effects, i.e. we desire 
some things because they would help us achieve something else. While these desires are 
instrumental, there are also intrinsic desires. We want certain things for their own sake. 
Such desires are intrinsically rational if there are reasons to have them. There might, 
however, be desires that, although they are intrinsically irrational, we still have reason to 
have. When discussing this, Parfit writes: 
  
If we believe that having some desire would have good effects, what that belief 
makes rational is not that desire itself, but our wanting and trying to have it. 
Irrational desires may have good effects. Thus, if I knew that I shall be tortured 
tomorrow, it might be better for me if I wanted to be tortured, since I would 
then happily look forward to what lies ahead. But this would not make my 
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desire rational. It is irrational to want, for its own sake, to be tortured. The 
good effects of such a desire might make it rational for me, if I could, to cause 
myself to have it. But that would be a case of rational irrationality.68  
 
It is, as Parfit writes, clearly intrinsically irrational to want to be tortured. But, since having 
such a desire would have good effects, it seems rational to, if possible, cause myself to 
have it. Thus, according to Parfit, there can be desires that it is rational to want and try to 
have, but irrational to have. Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen disagree 
and write: 
 
While attractive, this line of thought is unconvincing. To be sure, if a pro-
attitude is either instrumentally or finally valuable, we do have reasons to want 
it or to try to have it. () But why should we deny, as Gibbard69 and Parfit 
want us to, that we also have reasons to have these valuable attitudes? () As 
far as we can see, () Parfit [has] no argument for [his] claim, apart from 
appeal to an intuition that we dont share. 70  
 
The views of both parties, I believe, make sense. In one sense it seems obvious that I, in 
Parfits example, have a reason to have a desire to be tortured. Does this mean that it can 
be rational to want to be tortured for its own sake? Here the answer seems to be No. 
What should we think of this? Compare this with the case we discussed earlier where it 
was good for me to believe what it would be irrational to believe. It would have been good 
if I believed what there was no evidential reason for me to believe. But since I, as a rational 
individual, find it hard to believe what there seems to be no reason to believe, the thing to 
do seemed to be to try to, in some way, deceive myself. Such self-deception would, in this 
case, be rational, since it would bring about good effects. The same seems to be true in the 
case where wanting to be tortured would have good effects. If I am (substantively) rational 
it seems hard to imagine that I ever would desire to be tortured, but it is imaginable that I 
could realise that it would be better if did have this desire. Thus, it would be better in this 
case if I was irrational, and therefore the rational thing to do seems to be to try to become 
irrational.  
      While these considerations seem to favour Parfits view, they also seem to favour the 
view that we can have reasons to have irrational desires and beliefs. We should, I think, 
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agree with Parfit that these cases are cases of rational irrationality. Believing that it would 
be rational to want to be tortured cannot make it rational to want to be tortured. But since 
being irrational could have good effects, it can be rational to cause oneself to become 
irrational. If I already have a desire to be tortured, I would be deeply irrational. But, if I 
dont have this irrational desire, I could, rational as I am, realise that it would be better if I 
was irrational during a certain period of time, and, therefore cause myself to become 
irrational if that is possible. This would be rational self-deception or, as Parfit calls it, 
rational irrationality. So although there can be reasons for having irrational beliefs or 
desires, this doesnt mean that such beliefs or desires would be intrinsically rational. This, 
to me, does not appear strange.  
      We can, in order to illustrate this further, consider these four ways71 in which desires 
can be supported by reasons and thereby be rational: 
 
 
 
Intrinsically rational 
desires: 
 
 
Facts72 about the object of desire 
give us reasons to have this desire 
 
Instrumentally rational 
desires: 
 
 
The effects of having a desire give us 
reasons to have this desire 
 
 
Intrinsically rational but instrumentally 
irrational desires: 
 
Though facts about the object of 
desire give us reasons to have this 
desire, the effects of having the desire 
give us reasons not to have it 
 
 
Intrinsically irrational but instrumentally 
rational desires: 
 
Though facts about the object of 
desire give us reasons not to have this 
desire, the effects of having this desire 
give us reasons to have it 
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A desire like the desire in Parfits example to be tortured is intrinsically irrational but 
instrumentally rational, and therefore we can, I believe, say that there can be reason for, 
not only wanting and trying to have it, but also for actually having it. And as this desire is, 
in one sense, irrational, while it, in another sense, is rational, the label rational 
irrationality seems fitting.  
      We can also consider an example in which a desire is intrinsically rational but 
instrumentally irrational. Suppose I live in a dictatorship and that, as Im not too happy 
about it, I desire to live in a democracy without an evil dictator. Now if this desire becomes 
known, I may be in big trouble. So here we have a case in which my desire, although it is 
intrinsically rational, is instrumentally irrational. This, then, becomes a case of what we 
can call irrational rationality.  
      Remember now that I said that claims like x is good imply that there are reasons to 
care about, or want, x. This should not be taken to imply that being tortured is good. That 
would only have been true if wanting to be tortured was intrinsically rational. It is wanting 
to be tortured that, in this example, is instrumentally good. So whether it is the object of 
the desire or the desire itself that is good depends on whether the desire is intrinsically or 
instrumentally rational. If the desire is both intrinsically and instrumentally rational, then 
both the object of desire and the desire itself are good. If we accept this we will, I believe, 
dodge objections that, by means of counter-examples, try to show that it cannot be true that 
to say that something is good is basically the same as saying that we have reason to care 
about this thing.73  
 
Does ought imply can when it comes to reasons? 
 
It may now be asked how it could be that I, in the example where I am waiting to be 
tortured, can have a reason to have a desire to want to be tortured if I find it extremely hard 
to start wanting this. If we do assume that it, by means of sheer willpower, is virtually 
impossible to go from not wanting to be tortured to wanting to be tortured, then we might, 
from this, be tempted to draw the conclusion that one cannot have a reason to have this 
desire. One, we might say, cannot have reason to want something if it is impossibleor, at 
least, extremely hardto want this thing. I do, however, believe that this would be a 
mistake. When it comes to reasons the principle that ought implies can does not apply. 
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This is part of the point of the externalist view; thinking otherwise would, I think, be to 
take the internalist view. On the other hand, the principle in question is true when it comes 
to rationality judgments. Think of the example where my hotel is on fire. Suppose that my 
dog is with me in my room. Like me, it will, if it stays in the room, be badly burned or die. 
This makes it true that my dog, just I do, has a reason to jump out of the window along 
with me. My dog is not generally rational like me though. It could not, like me, understand 
that it has a reason to jump in the sense that I can. You cannot tell my dog that, since the 
room will soon be on fire, it has reason to jump out of the window. Nevertheless, it could 
still act like it has reason to act; it will most likely flee fire. However, it does not appear 
meaningful to call my dogs behaviour rational or irrational. It lacks the rational ability that 
persons have to think in terms of reasons. Beings that arent generally rational cannot act 
rationally or irrationally. That is something that only we, as persons, can do.  
      The externalist, as I have said, doesnt believe that it is our actual or counter-factual 
desires that provide us with reasons. Therefore, we dont have to claim that ought implies 
can when it comes to reasons. There is, thus, an asymmetry-relation between reasons and 
rationality in the sense that, while what one has reason to do isnt relative to whether one 
could, or would, be motivated by the belief that one has such a reason, it is only those who 
are generally rational that can rightfully be called irrational at times. Rationality is here, 
then, partly defined in terms of ability to respond to reasons, but reasons are not defined in 
terms of rationality. Taking such a non-reductionist view on reasons lets us avoid charges 
of circularity. Rational beings, we can say, are beings that believe that some things matter 
and that they should care about these things and live in certain ways. But, we need not, for 
this reason, disallow the possibility of these rational beings being mistaken at times. As 
rational beings, we know, as I said earlier, this to be true; it is part of our rational ability to 
be able to realise that some of our choices are bad choices and that some of our desires are 
ones that we shouldnt act on. 
 
What do reasons do and why are there reasons? 
 
What, then, is it for something to matter? I shall here not go thoroughly enough into this 
issue, but only make some remarks about what I take the realist view to imply. We can 
start with a somewhat controversial metaphysical claim, namely the claim that if 
something matters, then it has the normative property of mattering. What kind of 
properties, it may now be asked, are these supposed normative properties? Are they natural 
 49
properties? If they had been, then, it seems, we could prove that some things do really 
matter, or that some things really do have these properties. Why? Because natural 
properties usually (or always) have causal powers, which make it possible for us to, by 
means of experiments and observations, prove claims we make about them. Now, 
normative properties, as Ive argued, arent natural properties. They are non-natural 
properties. I recognise that claims like this usually give rise to objections about 
metaphysical queerness as well corresponding epistemic objections; if there are irreducibly 
normative truths, then how do we verify that our beliefs about them are true? Such 
objections, I believe, can be answered, but I shall not attempt to do so here.   
        Now, normative properties have no causal powers. This, I believe, is because 
normative properties are what might be called true-about properties74. Suffering has the 
normative property of it being true about it that it is worth avoiding. Truths have no causal 
powers. How, it may now here be objected, can it be that these truths matter if they lack 
causal powers? What do reasons do? What is the point of their existence? Well, reasons do 
not do anything by themselves to us. Reasons do not push us to act in certain ways.75 
What reasons do is rather to make it true that we should act in certain ways. This is the 
normative relation between reasons and our motivations that Ive been trying to argue in 
favour of. 
      Williams believes, as we have seen, that normative reasons can be explanatory reasons 
for peoples acting. I have denied this and said that what reasons explain is, rather, why we 
should live in certain ways. That, if anything, is what reasons do. If we ask how reasons 
can matter, we would, I believe, be asking whether it matters that some things matter. If 
that is a real question, its answer would, either way you go, be paradoxical, it seems, 
especially if the answer is No.  
      I dont think that we should look for a causal explanation of why there are reasons or 
normative truths. Compare this with how the existence of the universe is to be explained; is 
there a causal explanation of why the universe exists? The answer here, I believe, is No; 
the universe just happens to exist. It could have been the case, though it isnt, that it didnt 
exist. Though we may find it hard to imagine what that would have been like, we can 
understand the possibility of it being true. I have taken seriously the possibility of there 
being no normative truths and that nothing, thus, matters. But, I find it hard to see how it 
could be true that something like suffering isnt worth avoiding or that the well-being of 
others is not something that we have reason to care about. And, these truths, Im inclined 
to believe, arent made true by anything external to them; there is no causal explanation to 
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be given here. So, though one could say that it could have been true that nothing is actually 
worth caring about, it is hard to imagine what that would be like, in the same way as it is 
hard to imagine what it would have been like if the universe did not exist. So at the same 
time as I think that there is an epistemic possibility- it is possible for all we know-that 
there are no normative truths, I think that if there are normative truths, then these truths 
are, or must be, metaphysically necessary truths. By this I, for instance, mean that suffering 
couldnt have been anything but bad; an opposite claim appears unintelligible. This means 
that, in all possible worlds, it is true that suffering is bad, or worth avoiding.    
      It may now be asked if these normative truths are mind-independent. To answer this, 
we should reflect on what it is that makes things worth wanting, or worth avoiding. On 
realism the answer, as Ive said, is that it is features of the objects of desire, and not our 
desires that give us reasons to act, or want to act. If there were no beings that could want 
things or that could reason, then there wouldnt be any beings of whom it would be true 
that they have reason to want certain things or who could be rational in wanting certain 
things. Does this mean that normative truths are mind-dependent? The answer, I believe, is 
No; independently of the existence of rational beings, there could still be normative 
truths, just like there would be truths about other things. It was true that the universe 
existed long before there were any rational beings that could grasp this truth. So, if all 
humans vanished from the face of the earth, it could still be true that if there were any 
human beings, they would have had reasons to want certain things and to act in certain 
ways. If there came along rational aliens, or if some other earthly species evolved in a 
manner that gave them a rational ability similar to, or superior to, ours, then these beings 
could, I believe, understand these normative truths just as we do. Perhaps they would have 
a better ability than ours to do so. Some normative question and some questions about 
values are really hard for us to answer. These questions might be better understood by 
others.  
 
Summary 
 
I have distinguished between three kinds of reasons; normative, motivating and 
explanatory reasons. When we talk about these different kinds of reasons, we need to keep 
in mind that we are talking about different things. There is a deep difference between 
claims about normative reasons and claims about motivating or explanatory reasons. The 
difference is, simply put, that normative claims are normative and that they cannot, 
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therefore, be reduced to claims about motivation or to other causal explanations. Williams 
internalism, I have argued, fails to recognise this difference. Internalists claim that there is 
a necessary connection between our reasons and our motivations. We can, I have argued, 
deny that there is such a necessary connection, because if we allow it, we have to draw 
absurd conclusions about what reasons certain people have and, more importantly, dont 
have.                 
      The view I have been trying to defend, I have called Normative Realism. On this view 
it is irreducibly true that some things are worth caring about. Though I havent intended to 
defend any substantive claims about exactly what we should care about, I have used the 
example of suffering as something that there is reason to want to avoid. That this seems 
obviously true seems to be enough for there to be a reason to believe this. Beliefs of this 
kind are, or so Ive argued, intrinsically rational. And this is one out of four ways in which 
beliefs can be rational. Beliefs can also be rational because they are supported by 
evidential reasons, because they are consistent with other beliefs that we have, or because 
having them would have good consequences. I have also distinguished between four kinds 
of rational desires. Desires can be intrinsically rational, instrumentally rational, 
intrinsically rational but instrumentally irrational or intrinsically irrational but 
instrumentally rational. Something that speaks in favour of the realist view is that it allows 
for the possibility of desires being intrinsically rational.  
      My main aim in this paper has been to try to explain why I believe that we ought to 
reject Williams internalist view on reasons. For this reason I havent tried to defend 
normative realism against some of the objections that can be raised against it. As Ive said, 
I do, however, believe that it is possible to do so. 76 
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1 Most importantly in Internal and External Reasons (henceforth IER) in Moral Luck Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, but also in Internalism and the obscurity of blame (IROB) in Making Sense of Humanity 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 and other articles. 
2 Constructivism is, very roughly, the view that we have reasons to want or do certain things because there are 
correct ways of arriving at the conclusion that we have these reasons. Rawls theory with his idea of a reflective 
equilibrium is an example of this. See his A Theory of Justice Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. 
3 I hope to do both of these things elsewhere. Why I think that we should prefer a realist view to a constructivist 
view will, however, be implicitly explained. I argue, for instance, that what gives us reasons to want certain 
things are features of the objects of desire. This is something that followers of constructivist would not agree 
with. It can also be noted that when I argue in favour of a non-reductionist view on normative concepts, I take 
myself to be answering objections against and making positive claims about the realist version of externalism 
rather than the constructivist version. There are, despite that, arguments that I use against the internalist view that 
could be used by a constructivist externalist or some other kind of externalist as well.   
4 There are several ways of classifying reasons that I will not talk about. Nagel speaks of objective and 
subjective reasons in The possibility of altruism Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. Gibbard distinguishes 
motivating reasons from potential reasons in Wise choices, Apt feelings Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 
Scanlon, in his What we owe to each other Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, contrasts objective 
and operative reasons. And so on. Too many distinctions will only cause confusion.  
5 This example is one that Derek Parfit uses. I have, however, added some further details to it. 
6 In saying this I am not meaning to exclude the possibility of akrasia. Surely we can fail to act on what we take 
to be good reasons to act. 
7 Wlodek Rabinowicz has pointed out to me that while what I claim in my example above (where an explanatory 
reason isnt a motivating reason) might be true, it is also possible that the reverse of this might be true. He made 
the following comment: There are (---) cases in which motivating reasons are not explanatory. Example: If I 
believe that X needs help, this might provide me with a motivation to help. (If need not, of course. It might also 
leave me cold.) But if I have this motivation, but help X by pure reflex, then my motivating reason is not an 
explanatory reason. Or, to take another example, if I do have this motivation to help, but abstain from helping, 
for example because I also have a stronger motivation against helping X (say, helping him would be too 
onerous), then my motivation to help does not explain my behaviour. So even when behaviour is intentional, 
some motivating reasons need not be explanatory. Surely there can be some motivating reasons that arent 
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explanatory when we act intentionally, but while this may be true, I still believe that other motivating reasons 
will be explanatory when we act intentionally.  
8 That I have a reason to x is true because some fact obtains. Because I believe that this fact obtains, I believe 
that I have a reason to do x. I return to this under the heading The relation between normative and motivating 
reasons 
9 Once again: Because I believe that some fact obtains, I believe that I have a reason to act. Because I believe 
that I have this reason it is likely that I become motivated to do this thing, and because of this it may be the case 
that I act. 
10 Practical Reality, (PR) p. 167 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 
11 I have, up until now, spoken of things being good reasons for acting in order to avoid confusion. Now that I 
have mentioned this I can drop the addition of good.  
12 The addition may have rhetoric or stylistic value though.   
13 IER P. 101. I write do x instead of phi. Even if Williams points out that phi stands for some verb of action I 
want to make it explicit that it is reasons for actions that he is talking about.  
14 IROB p. 35 My italics 
15 p. 40 My italics 
16 However, we should note that externalism about reasons dos not, by itself, commit one to the non-reducibility 
thesis.  
17 Parfit, who I in many ways follow, calls his version of this view Practical Realism. That I prefer to call it 
Normative Realism has to do with that what we are discussing here is normative reasons and the nature of 
normativity. Moreover, calling this view Practical Realism may be misleading in the sense that it may make it 
appear that this view is only a view about reasons for acting. As I will argue, I believe that the most important 
reasons are reasons for desiring.  
18 IROB p. 35 
19 IER pp. 102-104 
20 IER p. 102 
21 This could be a non-reductionist internalist view. I will later return to the possibility of such views. 
22 my italics 
23 Postscript to IER in Varieties of Practical Reasoning ed. Millgram, Elijah Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001. 
p. 91 
24 IROB p.36 
25 Rediscovering Reasons work in progress  
26 Values, Reasons and the Theory of Persuasion, in Ethics, Rationality and Economic Behaviour eds. Farina, 
Francesco, Hahn, Franic and Vannucci, Stefano, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. p. 67 
27 p. 68 
28 p. 68 
29 I return, later on, to what I mean by intrinsically irrational. 
30 IER p. 105-106 
31 IROB p.37 
32 pp. 37-38 
33 IROB p. 36 
34 P. 36. My italics. 
35 See Principia Ethica Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993 
36 Sidgwick suggested this kind of argument when he discusses analytical utilitarianism. Note 1 on p. 26 in The 
Methods of Ethics. Cambridge: Hacket Publishing, 1981 
37 Rediscovering Reasons 
38 Rediscovering Reasons  
39 I hope to do so elsewhere. Later on, under the heading What do reasons do and why are there reasons?, I will, 
however, make some further brief remarks about what I take normative properties to be like that attempts to 
show why we should accept a non-naturalist view.   
40 Rediscovering Reasons 
41 Shelly Kagan seems to endorse such a view in his The limits of morality Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989. p. 388 
42 Found in Hares Moral thinking Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981 
43 Even if the concept of soundness perhaps best is understood as evaluative, the appeal to sound deliberation, 
i.e. the claim that there should be a sound deliberative route, is clearly normative.  
44 IER p. 103 
45 P. 39 
46 IER p. 106 
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47 p. 106 
48 Ill discuss this further in the next section. 
49 Internalism proposition (iii) above. 
50 IER p. 102 
51 Actually, Dancy does. I will, after this section, discuss what Dancy has to say about this. 
52 My italics. 
53 IER p. 109 
54 Korsgaard writes: Practical-reason claims, if they are really to present us with reasons for action, must be 
capable of motivating rational persons. in Skepticism about Practical Reason p. 317 in Creating the Kingdom of 
Ends New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.   
55 Such a theory, I said earlier on, claims that we act because we are in certain mental states. 
56 PR p. 167 
57 p. 167 
58 The difference between false and true belief on the agents part cannot alter the form of the explanation which 
will be appropriate to his action IER p. 102 
59 Just believing anything isnt likely to get you running. The important thing in this case is that he believes that 
he is being chased by a tiger. This, i.e. the content of his belief, is what he takes to give him a reason to run. Thus 
we can say that, while he takes himself to be running because he is being chased by a tiger, the explanatory 
reason why he is running is that he has a certain belief. It is the fact that he believes something that motivates 
him to run. The explanation of why he is running is thus that he takes himself to be having a reason to run. So, 
remembering that explanatory and motivating reasons arent necessarily the same things will help us see what 
the relation between motivating and normative reasons is like. 
60 I hope to discuss these things at greater length elsewhere. 
61 Quoted by Parfit in Rationality and Reasons in Exploring Practical Philosophy, eds. Egonsson, Dan et al 
Ashgate, 2001  p. 25 
62 P. 25 
63 Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987 
64 Some non-cognitivists might tell us that there cannot be any normative beliefs. There can, they say, only be 
normative attitudes because there is no such thing as, for example, moral truths that could make our normative 
beliefs true or false. I believe that such a view is mistaken. Without arguing for this here I will assume that there 
really can be normative beliefs. It doesnt even matter, I would say, whether there is such a thing as moral truths,  
because even in the absence of such truths we could still have normative beliefs.  
65 Or to want, bring about, have a pro-attitude towards this thing. I will not discuss this much further here.  
66 I dont mean by this that these claims have the same meaning. Rather, what I say is that there is a relation of 
symmetrical implication.  
67 Reasons in Reason and Value: Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, eds. R. Jay Wallace, Michael 
Smith, Samuel Scheffler, and Philip Pettit, Oxford University Press. The version I have of the text is, however, 
one that may not be the final version. See: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0060/pdf/reasons.pdf 
68 Rationality and Reasons p. 27 
69 Gibbard, in Wise choices, Apt feelings, endorses a view that has similarities with Parfits. 
70 In The Strike of the Demon (forthcoming) 
71 Though I havent here included desires that are both intrinsically and instrumentally rational, I believe that 
there can be such desires as well.  
72 There is actually a need for further qualification here, as this definition of what it is for desires to be 
intrinsically rational appears to ignore the difference between two kinds of cases. In cases of the first kind it is 
intrinsic facts about the object of desire that give us reason to have this desire, whereas it, in cases of the second 
kind is extrinsic facts about the object of desire that give us reasons to have this desire. Since I havent at this 
time been able to come up with any good enough names for these separate kinds of rational desires, I here use, 
well aware of its shortcomings, this wider definition.   
73 Such objections are discussed in The Strike of the Demon 
74 A claim like this obviously needs to be explained further. My ambition is to do so in a paper that will also deal 
with the kind of objections against realism that Ive mentioned above.  
75 Some writers, it seems, take normativity to be some motivational force. Korsgaard, for instance, writes that 
the normativity of obligation is, among other things, a psychological force. This, I believe, is a mistake. Even 
if normative reasons ought to motivate us, we should accept that, while facts about our motivating reasons are 
psychological facts, when we speak of normative reasons, what we are trying to decide is how we should be 
motivated. See Korsgaards The Meta-Physical Foundation of Normativity (John Locke-lectures: lecture 1) 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/Korsgaard.LL1.pdf 
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76 For helpful comments on earlier drafts I should like to thank Wlodek Rabinowicz and the participants of the 
seminars in Practical philosophy at Lund University.      
